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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM SERVER WAGE ON RESTAURANT GUEST 
TIPPING BEHAVIOR AND PERCEPTIONS 
 
by  
 
Jason Tang 
Dr. Carola Raab, Committee Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
  
Restaurant server income is predominantly composed of tips received from guests and the 
minimum server wage received from restaurants.  Grounded in equity theory, this dissertation 
investigated the effect of the minimum server wage, in combination with established antecedents 
of voluntary tipping, on tipping rate and examined guest perceptions of fairness of the minimum 
server wage and three prevalent tipping policies (voluntary tipping, automatic service charge, 
and service inclusive pricing).  Two experiments were conducted, a 2 (minimum server wage) x 
2 (service quality) experimental design, and a 2 (minimum server wage) x 3 (tipping policy) 
experimental design.  The results revealed that the minimum server wage and voluntary tipping 
familiarity have moderating roles on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  In addition, voluntary tipping has higher perceived 
fairness and higher perceived value than automatic service charge and service inclusive pricing.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumers around the world routinely engage in the practice of tipping after services 
have been performed by various service professionals such as restaurant servers, bartenders, taxi 
drivers, porters, golf caddies, and hair stylists (Azar, 2011; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Lynn & 
McCall, 2000; Lynn & Starbuck, 2015).  A traditional tip is discretionary consideration, 
transferred from a customer to a service provider, supplementing contractual consideration for 
goods and services rendered (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn, 2006b; Shamir, 1984).  
Tipping is an intriguing and a unique phenomenon because it is an example of a distinct 
economic transaction that is neither underpinned by a legal requirement nor a transactional 
obligation (Azar, 2003, 2004a; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn & Grassman, 1990).  Tipping 
is particularly pervasive and entrenched in the foodservice industry as the estimated total 
economic value of tipping in American restaurants exceeded $46.5 billion in 2009 (Azar, 2011).  
Early tipping studies were conducted largely from psychological and sociological perspectives as 
researchers were interested in emotional motivations for consumers to voluntarily adhere to the 
social norm of tipping (Crespi, 1947; Freeman, Walker, Borden, & Latané, 1975; Holloway, 
1985; Lynn, 2006b; Lynn, Zinkhan, & Harris, 1993; Shamir, 1984).  However, due to the 
considerable fiscal scale of this phenomenon, restaurant tipping has subsequently received 
increased attention from an economic centered perspective (Azar, 2003, 2007b, 2011, 2012; 
Lynn & Starbuck, 2015; Lynn & Wang, 2013).   
Fundamentally, tipping is an economic transaction where one agent pays another agent in 
exchange for providing a service (Azar, 2005a; Azar, Yosef, & Bar-Eli, 2015; Lynn, 2001).  
Although the mechanical process of tipping is wholly economical by nature, pure neo-classical 
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economic theory is unable to definitively explain and predict this phenomenon (Azar et al., 2015; 
Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997).  For example, the concept of economic pure self-interest would 
suggest that one-time restaurant guests would strive to maximize their utility by not tipping after 
receiving service, and that contrary actions would be seemingly irrational (Azar, 2011; Conlin, 
Lynn, & O’Donoghue, 2003; Frank, 1987).  As neo-classical economic theory is inadequate in 
fully elucidating tipping, researchers have turned to behavioral economics and social economics 
(Azar, 2003, 2005a; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999), two economic subfields that consider the role 
of social norms, to enhance understanding of this phenomenon.  Established in psychology, 
social norms affect economic behavior as psychologists suggest that people conform to social 
norms as a means to be liked and accepted by others (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 1999, p. 294), 
resulting in attainment of positive emotional utility.  If a restaurant guest violates the social norm 
of tipping, s/he incurs emotional disutility through feelings of embarrassment, guilt, unfairness, 
and self-image impairment (Azar, 2003).  Empirical studies indicate that rudimentary neo-
classical economic theory supplemented with behavioral motivations, such as social norms 
conformity, can explicate the economic elements of the tipping phenomenon (Azar, 2003; 
Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997; Greenberg, 2014). 
Server income in the United States is generally composed of two components, a direct 
hourly wage received from employers and tips received from restaurant guests (Azar, 2012; 
Lynn, 2017a; Wessels, 1997), with tips comprising a majority share (Azar, 2003a, 2005a, 2009; 
Lin & Namasivayam, 2011; Miller, 2010; Wessels, 1997).  American restaurants 
characteristically remunerate servers at the lowest possible legal wage (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 
2005; Lin & Namasivayam, 2011; Sturman, 2001; Wessels, 1997), a wage that is governed by 
federal, state, county, and municipal legislations.  Consequently, as of January 1, 2019, the 
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minimum server wage spectrum in the United States ranges widely from $2.13 per hour to 
$16.00 per hour (City of Seattle, 2019; US Department of Labor, 2019b; Working Washington, 
2019).  
Voluntary tipping, the most ubiquitous form of tipping in the United States, occurs 
autonomously after services have been fully rendered and transactional consideration has been 
transferred from guest to restaurant (Azar, 2012; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997; Brown & Rolle, 
1991; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  The amount of such tips, if any, is determined at the guest’s sole 
discretion and is paid directly from agent to agent, guest to server.  Compulsory tipping, an 
alternative to traditional voluntary tipping, occurs when a mandatory supplemental fee is added 
to the transactional consideration that is transferred from guest to restaurant (Azar, 2012; Brown 
& Rolle, 1991).  Automatic service charge and service inclusive pricing are two tipping policies 
that are categorized as compulsory tipping (Azar, 2012; Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Wang, 2013; 
Wang & Lynn, 2017).  An automatic service charge is a fee that is calculated as a percentage of 
the total menu charges and added to the bill (Azar, 2012; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Service 
inclusive pricing incorporates the compulsory tip component directly into the price of each menu 
item resulting in higher menu item prices (Azar, 2012; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Restaurants 
employing either automatic service charge or service inclusive pricing would explicitly 
communicate to guests that voluntary tipping at the end of the meal is neither expected nor 
required (Azar, 2012), and would transfer the compulsory tip amount to servers through either an 
increased direct wage or a tip out (Azar, 2012; Namasivayam & Upneja, 2007). 
Restaurant tipping is an intriguing topic that continues to capture the attention of both 
contemporary researchers and industry stakeholders.  Discussions regarding the appropriateness 
of different tipping policies (Azar, 2004a; Evans & Dave, 1999; Lynn, 2006a; Wang & Lynn, 
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2007) and the minimum wage applicable to servers (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 2005; Azar, 
2004a; Sturman, 2001; Wessels, 1997) are not novel.  However, topical public discourse and 
public policy trends surrounding increases to the minimum server wage across the United States 
(Even & Macpherson, 2014; Koku & Savas, 2016; Lynn, 2017b) have revitalized interest in the 
suitability of competing tipping policies (Azar, 2012; Lynn, 2018; Lynn & Brewster, 2018; Lynn 
& Wang, 2013; Wang & Lynn, 2017).  Legislative directives and public opinion surrounding the 
minimum server wage and tipping policies are notably important to restaurant operators as both 
elements significantly, and directly, influence total labor cost (Azar, 2011, 2012; Lynn & 
Withiam, 2008).   
Average labor cost for publicly-traded full-service restaurants between 1973 and 2012 
was 30.52% of total revenue (Mun & Jang, 2018) and median labor cost was 32.50% of total 
revenue in 2014 (National Restaurant Association & Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016).  It is 
reasonable to expect labor cost to persist as a significant expense item on restaurant income 
statements due to low unemployment rates (Maze, 2018) and recently enacted legislations 
supporting higher minimum server wages in numerous jurisdictions including: Seattle - $16.00 
per hour (City of Seattle, 2019); San Francisco - $15.59 per hour (City and County of San 
Francisco, 2019); and the City of New York - $15.00 per hour (New York State, 2019).  Median 
pre-tax income for full-service restaurants in 2014 amounted to 6.10% of total sales (National 
Restaurant Association & Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016), accentuating that restaurants operate 
with low profit margins and that restaurateurs need to deliberately focus on understanding and 
controlling labor costs. 
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Purpose of the Study 
Gaps in the tipping literature, along with contemporary public debate surrounding the 
minimum server wage, have led to calls for further research on the effect of the minimum server 
wage and the effect of tipping policy on the restaurant industry (Even & Macpherson, 2014; 
Lynn, 2017b, 2018; Lynn & Brewster, 2018; Lynn & Wang, 2013; Wang and Lynn, 2017).  As 
no past study has simultaneously examined guest perceptions of the minimum server wage in 
conjunction with tipping policy, this dissertation will pioneer such an investigation.  The purpose 
of this research is to understand the boundary effects of the minimum server wage and tipping 
policy on guest tipping behavior and attitudes.  Insights gained will contribute to enhanced 
understanding of the tipping phenomenon in the restaurant industry.  The overarching objective 
of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of the minimum server wage, in combination with 
established antecedents of voluntary tipping, on tipping rate and examine guest perceptions of 
fairness and value towards the minimum server wage and restaurant tipping policies.  Three 
prevailing modern tipping policies will be examined: voluntary tipping, automatic service 
charge, and service inclusive pricing.   
Research Questions 
 The aforementioned research objectives will be achieved through two distinct studies. 
Focusing on voluntary tipping, Study One investigates the influence of the minimum server wage 
on tipping rate while considering established antecedents of tipping comprising of service 
quality, perceived fairness, empathy, and familiarity.  Specifically, Study One addresses the 
research question: Is there a relationship between the minimum server wage and tipping rate?  
Study Two directs attention towards guest perceptions of the minimum server wage in 
combination with tipping policy while controlling for empathy.  Distinctively, Study Two 
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addresses the research question: Are perceived fairness of tipping policy and perceived value of 
restaurant purchases affected by the minimum server wage and tipping policy?  
Significance of Study 
 This current research contributes to both theoretical literature and practical knowledge of 
restaurant tipping.  From a theoretical perspective, this current investigation is unique as it 
explores the effect of the minimum server wage on guest tipping behaviors and attitudes while 
pioneering an inquiry of the minimum server wage and tipping policy taken together.  Since 
initially capturing the attention of academicians in the mid-20th century, restaurant tipping has 
been prolifically researched, particularly over the past three decades.  Specific attention has 
focused on the motivators and the predictors of voluntary restaurant tipping.  Numerous studies 
have found support for the influence of social norms and a desire for guests to enforce and 
maintain equitable relationships with servers as primary motivations for voluntary tipping (Azar, 
2003, 2004b, 2005a; Lynn et al., 1993; Lynn & Graves, 1996; Lynn & Sturman, 2010).  The 
equitability of the minimum wage, and distinctively the minimum server wage as it pertains to 
the restaurant industry, has also been deliberated (Azar, 2004a, 2012; Baker, 2018; Ingraham, 
2018; Leins, 2018).  However, the literature has not explored the association between the 
minimum server wage and tipping behavior nor has it investigated the relationship between the 
minimum server wage and tipping policies from a guest perspective.  The conventional 
restaurant tipping rate has increased from 15% in the 1980s to the current average of 20% (Azar, 
2004b; Shy, 2015), while the lowest minimum server wage of $2.13 per hour has prevailed since 
1991 (Allegretto & Nadler, 2015; Jones, 2016; US Department of Labor, 2019b).  This 
dissertation contributes to restaurant tipping literature by combining the minimum server wage 
with established tipping motivations of adhering to social norms and maintaining equitable 
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guest-server relationships.  Study One responds directly to Even and Macpherson’s (2014) call 
for research into how tip credits used to derive a tipped minimum wage, a minimum server wage 
that falls below the federal minimum wage, affect servers’ pay composition and their specific 
question of “Do customers respond to higher wages of tipped workers by cutting back on tips?” 
(Even & Macpherson, 2014, p. 655).  Using panel data covering a 20-year period, Allegretto and 
Nadler (2015) found that a 10% increase in the tipped minimum wage only increased the income 
of servers employed at this wage by 0.4% and suggested that future research could benefit from 
inquiries into the components and composition of server pay.  Study One seeks to respond to this 
appeal by investigating whether voluntary tipping rate is influenced by the minimum server 
wage. 
Past research on tipping policies have focused on the effect of competing policies on 
outcomes such as restaurant labor costs (Lynn, 2017b), consumer preferences (Lynn, 2006a), 
customer satisfaction (Lynn, 2017b, 2018; Lynn & Brewster, 2018), and guest deal perception 
(Wang & Lynn, 2017).  The results of these previous studies have established a basis to petition 
for future research on the intricacies of tipping policies, including relative expensiveness (Lynn, 
2006a); other benefits and costs (Lynn, 2018); measures of nuanced differences (Lynn & 
Brewster, 2018); guest expectations, patronage, and spending (Lynn & Brewster, 2018); guest 
perceptions of fairness (Wang & Lynn, 2017); and the role of familiarity (Lynn, 2017b).  Extant 
minimum server wage research has focused primarily on the relationship between the minimum 
server wage and menu pricing (Aaronson, French, & MacDonald, 2008; Allegretto & Reich, 
2018; Dube, Naidu, & Reich, 2007; Fougère, Gautier, & Le Bihan, 2010; Lemos, 2004; 
MacDonald & Aaronson, 2006), leaving a notable gap in the relationship between the minimum 
server wage and restaurant tipping as a pricing mechanism.  Since tipping facilitates the 
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partitioning of prices between the value offerings of tangible food product and intangible service 
delivery, tipping literature has advocated the use of tipping as a pricing mechanism (Lynn & 
Wang, 2013; Lynn & Withiam, 2008; Wang & Lynn, 2017).  Researchers have articulated that 
the relationship between tipping and pricing requires further examination (Lynn & Wang, 2013).  
Study Two aims to contribute to this area of the tipping literature by examining the relationships 
among the minimum server wage, tipping, and pricing. 
Past minimum wage studies have centered around relatively smaller increases of the 
minimum wage, such as the 1996-1997 increase to the federal minimum wage from $4.25 per 
hour to $4.75 per hour on October 1, 1996 and to $5.15 on September 1, 1997 (Bernstein & 
Schmitt, 1998).  Contemporary increases to the minimum wage, and correspondingly the 
minimum server wage, are relatively larger, such as an increase from $10.50 to $15.00 over a 
three-year period in New York (New York State, 2019).  Considerable increases to the binding 
minimum wage will have significant practical implications for restaurant operators.  This 
research will provide new insights for restaurant operators to consider as they adapt current 
business models in response to evolving labor regulations levied onto their industry.  
Investigating the combined effect of the minimum server wage and tipping policy is significant 
to restaurateurs as the restaurant industry characteristically operates with high operating 
expenses (Mun & Jang, 2018) and low profit margins (National Restaurant Association & 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016).  If voluntary tipping rates decline as guests become familiar with 
higher minimum server wages, the burden of responsibility for remunerating servers will shift 
further from guests to operators, successively increasing labor costs and further eroding 
profitability.  Substituting voluntary tipping with an alternative tipping policy may be an 
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effective solution for restaurant operators to address this challenge.  This research endeavors to 
provide insight into the viability of this opportunity.  
Delimitations 
Limitations of this research include the following: 
1. This research is restricted to restaurant servers and does not consider other restaurant 
positions that frequently receive tips, such as bartenders, hosts/hostesses, and maître 
d’hôtels.  
2. This research focuses exclusively on external tipping policies.  Internal tipping policies 
involving tip pooling and tip sharing between servers and other restaurant staff are 
beyond the scope of this investigation.  
3. The research results may not generalize to non-restaurant tipping situations.  
4. The studies conducted for this research utilized online hypothetical scenarios depicting a 
restaurant dining scenario.  Consequently, research findings are bounded by ecological 
validity, limiting the generalizability of results beyond the context of this dissertation.  To 
mitigate against this limitation, realism checks of the experimental designs were 
conducted to ensure that experiment conditions are sufficiently realistic and comparable 
to real-world restaurant situations. 
5. Participants were recruited by an online market research firm and data were collected 
using online hypothetical scenarios that did not involve real monetary transactions.  
Consequently, the results of this study may not reflect actual guest tipping behavior or 
perceptions.  The majority of social sciences experimental research is bounded by similar 
limitations.  To address this limitation, internal validity of this current research has been 
verified.  
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Definition of Key Terms 
 Key concepts and terminology of the current research are defined as follows: 
 Minimum server wage: The lowest legal hourly wage that a restaurant can remunerate 
tipped servers; equal to the prevailing minimum wage in a restaurant’s jurisdiction of operation 
less any available tip credit (US Department of Labor, 2019a, 2019b). 
 Tip: A monetary gift transferred from one agent to another agent (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 
1994; Lynn, 2006b; Shamir, 1984). 
 Voluntary tipping policy: An ubiquitous form of restaurant tipping in the United States 
where tips are transferred directly from guest to server; the amount of monetary consideration is 
determined at the guest’s sole discretion (Azar, 2003, 2004a; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn, 
2006b; Lynn & Grassman, 1990). 
 Compulsory tip: A mandatory surcharge collected by a restaurant through either an 
automatic service charge or service inclusive pricing; the amount of monetary consideration is 
determined by the restaurant (Azar, 2012; Brown & Rolle, 1991; Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Wang, 
2013; Wang & Lynn, 2017). 
 Automatic service charge: A fee calculated as a percentage of total food and beverage 
charges that is added to a guest’s bill (Azar, 2012; Lynn & Wang, 2013). 
 Service inclusive pricing: A compulsory tipping policy where the mandatory surcharge is 
embedded directly into the price of each menu item (Azar, 2012; Lynn & Wang, 2013). 
 Service quality: A guest’s discernment of the overall superiority of a service encounter 
(Kivela, Inbakaran, & Reece, 1999; Zeithaml, 1988) conducted by comparing anticipated service 
quality with perceptions of actual service quality received (Grönroos, 1982; Parasuraman, 
Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).   
 11 
 Perceived fairness: A judgment of the reasonableness and justness of a process or 
outcome (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  
Perceived value: The degree of perceived quality relative to price (Fornell, Johnson 
Anderson, Cha, & Bryant, 1996; Oh, 2000; Qin & Prybutok, 2008; Zeithaml, 1988). 
Summary 
 The contextual foundation of restaurant tipping and the minimum server wage were 
discussed in this chapter.  Possible relationships between the minimum server wage and tipping 
behavior, gaps in the literature, and considerations for restaurant operators were presented.  The 
following chapter will review extant literature on restaurant tipping, the minimum server wage, 
and the theoretical foundation of this research. Hypotheses will be presented throughout Chapter 
Two.  Chapter Three will present the research methodology and Chapter Four will present study 
results.  Lastly, Chapter Five will discuss research findings, theoretical implications, practical 
considerations, and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 This chapter comprehensively reviews the literature beginning with restaurant tipping and 
the minimum server wage.  Next, the theoretical background for this research is presented with a 
review of neo-classical economics, behavioral economics, social norms theory, and equity 
theory.  Subsequently, literature is reviewed on constructs of interest comprising of service 
quality, perceived fairness, empathy, perceived value, and familiarity.  Research hypotheses 
formulated with theoretical support in the extant literature are presented throughout this chapter 
and summarized at the end.  
Restaurant Tipping 
Restaurant tipping is an economic transaction where monetary consideration is 
exchanged between two economic agents; guest and server (Azar, 2005a; Azar, Yosef, & Bar-
Eli, 2015; Lynn, 2001).  Due to its significant economic scale, tipping is an extensively 
researched topic and a prominent phenomenon engrained in the American restaurant industry 
(Azar, 2009, 2011; Lynn, 2006b; Lynn & Wang, 2013; Mok & Hansen, 1999).  As tips are 
frequently under-reported to taxation authorities (Azar, 2009, 2011; Hemenway, 1993; Lynn, 
2018), the magnitude of tipping needs to be estimated (Azar, 2009, 2011).  The estimated value 
of tipping in American restaurants was nearly $42 billion in 2005 (Azar, 2007c), exceeded $46.5 
billion in 2009 (Azar, 2011), and, following the approximation method used in these two 
estimates, exceeded $68 billion in 2017.  Azar, an economist and prolific tipping researcher, 
calculated the 2005 and 2009 estimates by first referencing a study of tipping in American 
restaurants that reported an average tip amount of $6.52 on an average bill size of $34.67 for a 
weighted-average tip percentage of 18.8% (Parrett, 2003, Table 14).  Next, annual sales of food 
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and alcoholic beverages as per the Statistical Abstract of the United States (US Census Bureau, 
2010), an annual report published by the US federal government from 1878 to 2011 (ProQuest, 
2019), were examined.  Specifically, the 2009 sales in the following categories were aggregated: 
full-service restaurants - $182.9 billion; snack and non-alcoholic beverages - $19.9 billion; bars 
and taverns - $17.1 billion; and lodging places - $28.0 billion (US Census Bureau, 2010).  The 
weighted average tip percentage of 18.8% was multiplied by the total sales in these categories, 
$247.9 billion, to provide an estimated 2009 tipping total of $46.6 billion.  Since 2013, ProQuest 
has assumed responsibility for disseminating the Statistical Abstract of the United States 
(ProQuest, 2019).  To determine an updated estimate of the economic value of tipping, Azar’s 
approximation method was followed and the following 2017 food services revenues in the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States 2019 Online Edition were identified: drinking places 
(alcoholic beverages) - $25.7 billion; full-service restaurants - $290.9 billion; and snack and non-
alcoholic beverage bars - $47.3 billion (ProQuest, 2019).  The sum of these three categories is 
equal to $363.9 billion.  The product of the weighted average tip percentage of 18.8% (Parret, 
2003, Table 14) and total food and beverage sales of $363.9 billion provides an estimated 2017 
tipping total of $68.4 billion.  
 In addition to the considerable macroeconomic magnitude of the tipping phenomenon, 
tipping is also significant from a micro perspective as tips compose a majority share of total 
server income, approximately 58% (Azar 2009, 2011; Wessels, 1997), while direct employer 
wages represent the remaining minority portion (Azar, 2003, 2005b, 2007a; Brown & Rolle, 
1991; Lin & Namasivayam, 2011).   
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Voluntary Tipping 
Voluntary tipping, the most established tipping policy in the United States, involves a 
voluntary transfer of monetary consideration from guest to server after services have been fully 
rendered (Azar, 2012; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997; Brown & Rolle, 1991; Lynn & Wang, 2013; 
Miller, 2010).  As there is no contractual obligation underlying this tipping policy (Azar, 2003; 
Azar et al., 2015; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn, 2006b; Lynn, Zinkhan, & Harris, 1993; 
Shamir, 1984), guests determine the amount of tip, if any, at their sole discretion (Lynn & 
Grassman, 1990).  This unique characteristic is different from conventional economic 
transactions where the sum of monetary consideration is negotiated and agreed upon by both 
agents in a transaction.  The economic transaction arising from voluntary tipping, between guest 
and server, is separate from the economic transaction between guest and restaurant pertaining to 
payment for menu items purchased.  When a guest orders a meal at a restaurant, both agents in 
this transaction, the guest and the restaurant, have agreed upon the monetary consideration, the 
stated menu price, to be exchanged for the service of preparing the meal.  By ordering a menu 
item, the guest effectively accepts the restaurant’s negotiated price.   
 Restaurant guests ordinarily tip servers a percentage of the bill amount, a value known as 
the tipping rate (Shy, 2015).  Tipping literature has found that guests tend to tip proportionate to 
service quantity (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994).  As service quantity is often approximated by bill 
size, guests often tip as a percentage of the bill.  Servers benefit from the use of tipping rate to 
determine tip amount as this practice protects tip income against inflation, even if tipping rate 
remains constant over time (Shy, 2015).  Anecdotal evidence from casual dialog amongst guests 
and the common use of tipping rate as a variable to measure tipping behavior by researchers 
(Azar, et al., 2015; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Kim, Nemeschansky, & Brandt, 2017; Lynn & 
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Wang, 2013; O’Neil, 2015) indicate that tipping rate is a suitable unit of measure for appraising 
and measuring the magnitude of restaurant tipping.   
A study of the influence of national values on worldwide tipping behavior found that 
average restaurant tipping rate in 2001 varied widely from 3% in Yugoslavia to nearly 17% in 
The United States (Lynn & Lynn, 2004).  This extensive global range of tipping rate, stretching 
over fourteen percentage points, provides a preface of the degree of complexity underlying the 
determinants of tipping rate.  The conventional tipping rate implied in American society has 
progressively escalated from 10% at the turn of the 20th century to 15% in the 1980s and to 20% 
by the beginning of the 21st century (Azar, 2004b; Shy, 2015).  These customary anecdotal 
average tipping rates are generally consistent with findings from empirical studies (Bodvarsson 
& Gibson, 1999; Lynn, 2006b; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Parrett, 2003). 
Several disadvantages are associated with this traditional tipping policy.  As voluntary 
tipping requires guests to directly contribute to servers’ income, servers are effectively held 
accountable to two different agents, guests and restaurants.  Dual accountability leads to role 
conflict when guests and restaurants present servers with incongruent objectives (Miller, 2010; 
Shamir, 1980).  As tips compose the majority share of total income, voluntary tipping provides 
servers with a monetary incentive to meet guest objectives at the expense of restaurant objectives 
in role conflict situations (Jacob & Page, 1980; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Examples of server 
behaviors that benefit select guests while disadvantaging restaurants include giving away menu 
items free of charge and providing high levels of service quality to guests perceived to be good 
tippers to the detriment of service quality delivered to guests perceived to be poor tippers 
(Brewster, 2013, 2015; Harris, 1995; Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  Furthermore, a dependence on 
guests to voluntarily compensate servers produces unreliable income for servers while enabling, 
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and arguably encouraging, income tax evasion (Feintzeig, 2018; Lynn, 2017b, 2018; Lynn & 
Withiam, 2008; Namasivayam & Upneja, 2007; Picchi, 2014).  Finally, although restaurants are 
able to minimize direct labor costs by transferring a significant portion of server remuneration 
responsibility to guests, the foodservice industry is inundated with high server turnover (Lynn, 
1996; Mok & Hansen, 1999), which successively adds to overall restaurant operating costs 
through increased hiring and training expenses.  High server turnover rates may be influenced by 
the combination of low direct wages and unreliable tip income (Miller, 2010). 
 Other effects of voluntary tipping include pricing implications as the practice allows 
restaurants to set nominal menu prices at economically efficient levels (Miller, 2010).  Nominal 
restaurant prices are distinct fees that are either explicitly stated prices (e.g., menu prices) or 
unstated implicit surcharges (e.g., taxes and tips) that discretely represent components of a 
guest’s total cost to dine (Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  In contrast, a real restaurant 
price represents the total cost to dine and is equal to the sum of all explicit and implicit nominal 
prices (Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  Restaurants are able to partition value offerings 
between tangible food products and intangible service delivery through voluntary tipping (Lynn 
& Withiam, 2008).  Under a voluntary tipping policy, menu prices correspond to the tangible 
food component of a meal, while voluntary tips correspond to the intangible service delivery 
element of a dining experience.  As a result, restaurants are able to set explicit menu prices at 
lower levels since menu prices only represent a portion of the total meal cost.  Under this system, 
the cost of the service component of the meal is represented by the voluntary tip transferred 
directly from guest to server.  As voluntary tipping occurs after all services have been rendered, 
the server does not hold any bargaining power in the determination of the tip amount 
representing the monetary consideration of the tipping transaction.  Since only one agent, the 
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guest, determines the amount of consideration, tipping can be considered a form of voluntary 
pricing (Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Voluntary pricing provides guests with the authority to evaluate 
service quality and subsequently compensate servers appropriately in order to maintain an 
equitable agent to agent relationship. 
Compulsory Tipping 
Deliberation of the validity and the appropriateness of traditional voluntary tipping in the 
contemporary restaurant industry has received renewed attention from both industry 
professionals and academic researchers (Lynn, 2017b, 2018; O’Neil, 2015; Walker, 2018).  
Compulsory tipping, an alternative to voluntary tipping, replaces a guest’s discretionary tip with 
a mandatory surcharge that is integrated into the transactional consideration transferred from 
guest to restaurant (Azar, 2012; Brown & Rolle, 1991; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Guests dining at 
restaurants operating with a compulsory tipping policy are not expected to leave any additional 
volitional consideration.  Compulsory tipping encompasses two distinct tipping policies that 
allow restaurants to collect the mandatory surcharge representing the tip; automatic service 
charge and service inclusive pricing (Azar, 2012; Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Wang, 2013; Wang & 
Lynn, 2017).  The mandatory surcharge collected under an automatic service charge tipping 
policy, known as a service charge, is a nominal price that is calculated as a percentage of total 
menu item charges and explicitly added to the bill.  Alternatively, under a service inclusive 
pricing tipping policy, the mandatory surcharge is embedded directly into the price of each menu 
item.  Servers employed at restaurants utilizing either compulsory tipping policy would either 
receive a higher direct hourly wage or receive a tip out from the restaurant (Azar, 2012; 
Namasivayam & Upneja, 2007).  Notwithstanding the economic equivalence of automatic 
service charge and service inclusive pricing, when the compulsory surcharge is held constant, 
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research indicates that guests have different perceptions and attitudes towards these two types of 
compulsory tipping policies (Lynn & Wang, 2013; Wang & Lynn, 2017).   
Among the three available tipping policies (voluntary, automatic service charge, and 
service inclusive pricing), research of guest attitudes has found a preference for voluntary tipping 
(Azar, 2010; Lynn, 2017b).  Guests may prefer voluntary tipping due to popular perception that 
this policy increases service quality and affords an element of perceived control over a dining 
experience.  Past research has found that guests with higher levels of perceived control are more 
likely to have higher levels of satisfaction with a service encounter (Averill, 1973; Hui & 
Bateman, 1991; Kimes, 2009).  As a form of voluntary pricing, voluntary tipping increases guest 
perceptions of control as this policy provides an opportunity for guests to mitigate against a poor 
dining experience by tipping less or not tipping at all.  By tipping after all services have been 
rendered, guests have an opportunity to evaluate and consider service quality when determining 
an amount to tip, thereby supporting a common belief that voluntary tipping is a strong motivator 
for servers to deliver high levels of service quality (Kwortnik, Lynn, & Ross, 2009; Lynn & 
Brewster, 2018; Lynn & Wang, 2013). 
Minimum Server Wage 
Restaurants in the United States pervasively remunerate servers at the lowest wage 
allowable by law (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 2005; Lin & Namasivayam, 2011; Namasivayam & 
Upneja, 2007; Seok, Kim, & Mark, 2017; Sturman, 2001; Wessels, 1997).  Multiple 
jurisdictional levels, including city, county, and state, possess authority to pass legislation with 
respect to the minimum wage, provided that the federal minimum wage is at least satisfied.  As 
of January 1, 2019, the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour, however restaurants operating 
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in select jurisdictions are able to legally remunerate servers at a considerably lower wage due the 
availability of a tip credit in various states.   
Attributed to the prevalence of tipping, certain US jurisdictions have a tipped minimum 
wage that is calculated by applying a tip credit against the prevailing federal minimum wage, 
resulting in a legal wage below the federal minimum wage referred to as the tipped minimum 
wage (US Department of Labor, 2019b).  The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) stipulates that 
an employee must regularly collect at least $30 a month in tips to classify as a tipped employee 
and subsequently receive the tipped minimum wage (US Department of Labor, 2019a).  As 
servers working in restaurants with a voluntary tipping policy meet the criteria of a tipped 
employee, the minimum server wage is equal to the tipped minimum wage where such a wage 
exists.  In order for a restaurant to apply an available tip credit, a server’s hourly tips must be at 
least equal to the amount of the tip credit.  A labor economics study of the US restaurant server 
labor market found that the 1999 average total hourly income, composed of direct employer 
wages and tip income, of servers employed in states with a tip credit was 30% higher than the 
federal minimum wage (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 2005).  This finding suggests that the 
magnitude of tip income is sufficient to allow employers to apply tip credits where available.   
As of January 1, 2019, the maximum allowable tip credit is $5.13 per hour and when 
applied against the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour, the lowest possible minimum 
server wage is equal to $2.13 per hour.  Seventeen US states currently have a minimum server 
wage of $2.13 per hour, a rate that has prevailed since 1991 (Allegretto & Nadler, 2015; Jones, 
2016; US Department of Labor, 2019b).  Approximately two-thirds of Americans workers who 
earned a wage at or below the federal minimum wage in 2017 were employed in food serving 
and preparation positions (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018).  In jurisdictions where a tip credit 
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does not exist, the minimum server wage is equal to either the federal minimum wage of $7.25 
per hour or a superseding higher regional minimum wage.  As of January 1, 2019, the highest 
minimum wage in the nation is $16.00 per hour in Seattle, Washington (City of Seattle, 2019; 
Working Washington, 2019).  In summary, the continuum of minimum server wage in the 
United States spans extensively from $2.13 per hour to $16.00 per hour. 
Minimum Server Wage and Voluntary Tipping 
Despite compensating servers at the lowest possible legal wage, restaurants utilizing a 
voluntary tipping policy are able to attract and recruit servers capable of earning high total 
compensation (Azar, 2012; McAdams & von Massow, 2017; Namasivayam & Upneja, 2007; 
Ogbonna & Harries, 2002) as guests predominantly adhere to the social norm of tipping (Lynn & 
Starbuck, 2015; Lynn, 2017a).  For servers employed at restaurants operating with a voluntary 
tipping policy, a majority 58% of total income is derived from tips received from guests, while 
the remaining 42% minority is composed of direct wages received from restaurants (Anderson & 
Bodvarsson, 2005; Azar, 2003a, 2005a; Miller, 2010; Wessels, 1997).  In addition to financially 
benefiting servers, voluntary tipping has been found to increase social welfare; the total utility of 
all agents in an economic market (Azar, 2005a).  Utility, a conceptual metric, represents an 
agent’s preferences for benefit, gain, and satisfaction when faced with scarcity (Broome, 1991; 
Kreps, 1990; Varian, 1978).  Within the economic market of a restaurant, social welfare 
encompasses guest utility, server utility, and restaurant profit.  Tipping increases employee 
utility by contributing to total server income, while increasing restaurant profit as the 
phenomenon allows restaurants to attract and hire servers who are willing to accept the lowest 
legal hourly wage as direct compensation, thereby reducing operating costs (Ogbonna & Harris, 
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2002).  Lower operating costs transpire to lower menu prices resulting in higher guest utility as 
this agent incurs lower nominal menu prices. 
Past research suggests that permitting restaurants to legally remunerate servers at a lower 
wage promotes market efficiency and adds economic benefits by increasing demand for servers, 
which successively creates new jobs within a server employment market (Aaronson, French, & 
MacDonald, 2008; Wessels, 1993).  As restaurants customarily compensate servers at the lowest 
possible legal wage, increasing the minimum server wage will unavoidably lead to adverse 
financial implications for the restaurant industry.  Despite altruistic intentions, research has 
found evidence that under certain market structures, such as a local monopoly, increasing the 
minimum wage for tipped restaurant employees may result in net detrimental effects for various 
stakeholders (Azar, 2012; Shy, 2015).  To maintain a going concern, many restaurants operate 
contingent on the ability to remunerate tipped servers at a lower minimum server wage (Azar, 
2012).  Consequently, significant increases to the binding minimum server wage will require 
restaurants dependent on employing staff at the lowest legal wage to re-evaluate firm strategy in 
order to maintain operations as a going concern.  
Minimum Server Wage and Tipping Policy 
  Azar (2012) investigated the effect of the minimum server wage on restaurant firm 
strategy and developed the following equations to illustrate differences in the derivation of 
restaurant profitability and server utility under different tipping policies: 
Õ! = 𝑃 𝑒 − w! 
Õ' = 𝑃 𝑒 − w' − 𝑠 
U! = 𝑇 𝑒 +	w! − 𝐶 𝑒  
U' = w' − 𝐶 𝑒  
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Where,  
Õt = restaurant profit under a voluntary tipping policy 
Õs = restaurant profit under a compulsory tipping policy 
P = customer willingness to pay the restaurant for the meal 
wt = server wage under a voluntary tipping policy 
ws = server wage under a voluntary tipping policy 
s = compulsory tip 
Ut = server utility under a voluntary tipping policy 
Us = server utility under a compulsory tipping policy 
T = amount of voluntary tip 
C = cost of server effort  
e = server effort 
In these equations, customer willingness to pay (P), amount of voluntary tip (T), and cost 
of server effort (C) are all functions of server effort (e).  Expressing the amount of voluntary tip 
as a function of server effort implies that service quality has a direct effect on tipping rate.  
As these equations examine tipping policy and the minimum server wage strictly from an 
economic perspective, it is assumed that guest utility remains constant between voluntary tipping 
and compulsory tipping as there is no opportunity for guests to realize a consumer surplus from 
either tipping policy.  As a result, these equations delineate social welfare as the sum of 
restaurant profit and server utility, omitting guest utility.   
Using these equations and assuming that restaurants desire to maximize profitability, 
Azar (2012) posited that an equilibrium minimum server wage exists that determines whether a 
restaurant should implement a voluntary tipping policy or a compulsory tipping policy.  
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Explicating a relationship between the minimum server wage and tipping policy, Azar (2012) 
suggests that when the minimum server wage is below the equilibrium minimum server wage, 
restaurants should elect a voluntary tipping policy.  Conversely, when the minimum wage 
exceeds the equilibrium minimum server wage, a compulsory tipping policy should be adopted.  
Principally, these equations suggest that a higher minimum server wage can result in net negative 
economic effects.  Such outcomes occur when the minimum server wage exceeds the equilibrium 
minimum server wage resulting in lower server income, restaurant profitability, and 
subsequently social welfare. 
Across the United States, the minimum wage is a persistent subject of discussion among 
law makers, academicians, and the general public (Anderson & Bodvarsson, 2005; Azar, 2004a, 
2012; Baker, 2018; Ingraham, 2018; Leins, 2018).  Within these deliberations, the issues of tip 
credits and server tips with respect to the minimum wage are particularly contentious (DiPietro, 
2001; Feintzeig, 2018; Gould & Cooper, 2018; Picchi, 2014; Thebault, 2018).  Proponents 
advocating a higher minimum server wage and the elimination of tip credits are on one side of 
the debate, while opponents support a lower minimum server wage and the preservation of tip 
credits.  Interestingly, restaurants, guests, and servers are found on both sides of the controversy.  
Restaurants advocating to preserve tip credits are concerned that a higher minimum server wage 
will necessitate increased menu prices to mitigate against decreased profits (Lemos, 2004), while 
servers on this side of the debate are concerned that a higher minimum server wage will lead to 
lower tip income (Feintzeig, 2018; Picchi, 2014; Thebault, 2018).  Azar’s (2012) economic 
equations provide support from a theoretical economic perspective for these concerns; contingent 
that the minimum server wage exceeds Azar’s (2012) hypothesized equilibrium minimum server 
wage. 
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Minimum Server Wage and Restaurant Pricing 
Under a voluntary tipping policy, guests are effectively accepting partial responsibility 
for server compensation, allowing restaurants to remunerate servers at the minimum server wage 
(Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  Tip credits, where available, can be equated to a guest subsidy of a 
restaurant’s wage expense (Allegretto & Nadler, 2015).  As guests are subsidizing labor 
expenses through voluntary tipping, restaurants are able to charge lower nominal menu prices.  
Increases to the minimum server wage will compel restaurants to re-examine menu prices to 
offset increased labor costs.   
The degree to which restaurants increase menu prices in response to cost increases is 
known as pass-through (Fougère, Gautier, & Le Bihan, 2010).  Restaurant pricing studies have 
produced mixed results regarding the pass-through of minimum server wage increases to menu 
prices.  Overall, researchers agree that there is a positive correlation between the minimum 
server wage and restaurant pricing.  However, the literature is conflicted regarding the effect size 
of this relationship, with some studies finding significant effects (Aaronson et al., 2008; 
Allegretto & Reich, 2018; Basker & Khan, 2016; Fougère et al., 2010; MacDonald & Aaronson, 
2006), while other investigations finding small and non-significant effects (Dube, Naidu, & 
Reich, 2007; Lemos, 2004).  A review of over twenty minimum wage and restaurant pricing 
studies determined that restaurant pricing is generally sticky, as most studies found that a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage resulted in small effects as restaurant food prices increased by 
less than 4%, and overall restaurant prices increased by less than 0.4% (Lemos, 2004).  Fougère 
et al. (2010) found a significant positive effect of the minimum wage on price, but more 
importantly found that this effect is protracted as a change to the minimum wage requires over a 
year to influence menu prices.  Pricing literature also indicates that the effect of the minimum 
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wage on menu prices differs across restaurant types as fast food restaurants tend to report a 
higher pass-through rate compared to full-service restaurants (Basker & Khan, 2016; MacDonald 
& Aaronson, 2006).  Basker and Khan (2016) attributed this result to high elasticity of fast food 
products.   
MacDonald and Aaronson (2006) analyzed how the restaurant industry responded to the 
1996-1997 federal minimum wage increase and found that prices are sticky, as restaurants 
generally did not increase prices uniformly across all menu items.  This study investigated the 
effect of a relatively smaller minimum wage increase, as the federal minimum wage increased 
from $4.25 per hour to $4.75 per hour on October 1, 1996 and increased again to $5.15 on 
September 1, 1997 (Berstein & Schmitt, 1998).  The minimum server wage changes facing the 
contemporary restaurant industry involve relatively larger increases, such as the increase from 
$10.50 per hour to $15.00 per hour over a three-year period in New York (New York State, 
2019).  These comparatively larger increases to the minimum server wage may have larger 
effects on the pass-through rate of the minimum server wage to menu prices.   
The extent that restaurants can increase nominal menu prices is bounded by reasonable 
limits and once that limit is reached, restaurants will need to seek other methods to grow 
revenues for the purpose of offsetting higher labor costs.  Reframing the guest labor subsidy, 
embedded in a voluntary tipping policy, into a revenue stream is one possible alternative.  As 
previously described, Azar (2012) developed a set of economic equations that posited an 
equilibrium minimum server wage exists that determines whether a restaurant should elect a 
voluntary tipping policy or a compulsory tipping policy.  A compulsory tipping policy would 
facilitate a higher pass-through rate by adding a supplemental explicit nominal charge to the bill.  
There are documented examples of restaurants operating in business environments with large 
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minimum server wage increases that have transitioned from a voluntary tipping policy to a 
compulsory tipping policy, citing a high minimum server wage as an instrumental reason for the 
change in firm strategy (Dunn, 2018; Lynn, 2017b; O’Neil, 2015; Walker, 2018).  
Tipping literature supports server concerns of potential tip income reduction arising from 
the elimination of tip credits, as low direct wages has been identified as a motivation for guests 
to voluntarily tip (Azar, 2005b, 2010; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999).  However, the minimum 
server wage has never been directly tested as a predictor variable of tipping rate.  Furthermore, 
previous tipping research has not explored the relationship between the minimum server wage 
rate and tipping policy from a guest’s perspective.  This dissertation will address these gaps in 
the literature.  
Theoretical Background 
 A review of literature comprising the theoretical foundation of this dissertation is 
presented the following section. 
Neo-classical Economics 
 The term neo-classical economics has been used to describe and classify mainstream 
economics since it was derived in 1900 by Thorstein Veblen (Colander, 2000).  Over the past 
century, influential economists have contributed, augmented, and enhanced neo-classical 
economics with new assumptions, findings, and theory (Colander, 2000).  Two fundamental 
tenets of neo-classical economics are the assumptions of self-interest and rationality.  Self-
interest requires that economic agents strive to maximize value in a method motivated primarily 
by self-interest (Hamilton, 1919) when engaging in an economic transaction.  Rationality 
requires that all agents behave rationally when participating in an economic market (Archer, 
2013).  
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 Elements of tipping have been explained by neo-classical economic concepts.  However, 
due to frequent violations of the fundamental assumptions of rationality and self-interest, these 
concepts alone are unable to definitively explain the phenomenon of voluntary tipping 
(Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997).  Examples of guests, as economic agents, relinquishing self-
interest include guests who voluntarily tip after a meal despite not having any intention to return 
to a restaurant, guests who tip above the conventional tipping rate, and guests who tip 
notwithstanding a poor overall dining experience.  As the assumption of self-interest limits the 
power of neo-classical economics, other theories, such as dynamic game theory, have emerged to 
address economic phenomena.  Applying dynamic game theory to restaurant tipping requires 
identifying a relationship between services received and voluntary tipping (Bodvarsson & 
Gibson, 1997).  Research has investigated the effect of service received on voluntary tipping 
through variables such as food quality, service quality, service quantity, and equitable server-
guest relationships (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Lynn & Lynn, 2004).  
However, even with the support of dynamic game theory, neo-classical economics was found to 
only scarcely predict voluntary tipping rate, and does not provide rationale for the motivation 
behind voluntary tipping (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994, 1997).  Determining the underlying 
motivation for voluntary tipping requires examining theories outside the realm of mainstream 
economics. 
Behavioral Economics 
Researchers have consequently elucidated the practice of voluntary tipping by 
supplementing broad neo-classical theory with focused concepts from behavioral economics, 
such as social norms and social welfare (Azar, 2003, 2005a).  Behavioral economics is the 
amalgamation of economics and psychology focused on examining the effects of human 
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impediments and limitations as economic agents in an economic market setting (Mullainathan & 
Thaler, 2000).  The following three inherent human traits have been identified by behavioral 
economists to incite agent deviation from standard economic models: (1) bounded rationality, (2) 
bounded self-interest, and (3) bounded willpower (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000).  
Bounded rationality refers to the limitations of human cognitive abilities to sensibly 
problem solve resulting in decisions that violate rationality.  Common reasons for individuals to 
execute irrational actions include over-confidence, under-confidence, and biases arising from 
prior experiences (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Consider the 
scenario of a guest that endures a poor overall dining experience at a restaurant characterized by 
slow service, substandard food quality, and negative customer service interactions.  This was the 
guest’s first visit to the restaurant and the experience was so distasteful that s/he does not intend 
to revisit the establishment.  However, since this restaurant was highly recommended by a close 
friend, who is well acquainted with the restaurant staff, the guest nevertheless elects to leave a 
gracious tip for the server.  This scenario illustrates how behavioral motivations, such as under-
confidence and biases from past experiences, preclude an agent’s ability to act rationally.  As the 
guest is accustomed to leaving a tip after dining at a restaurant, s/he has allowed past experiences 
to bias the rational decision of not leaving a tip, an action warranted by the various service 
failures experienced throughout the meal.  Additionally, this hypothetical guest is potentially 
exhibiting the trait of under-confidence as s/he may not feel comfortable expressing 
dissatisfaction to the server by not tipping in fear that the server may expressively single him/her 
out in front of other guests for not tipping or inform the guest’s friend that s/he neglected to tip. 
Bounded self-interest encapsulates the tendency of individuals, as economic agents, to 
regularly forego self-interest for the benefit of others (Fehr & Gächter, 2000).  Although neo-
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classical economic theory acknowledges the existence of human altruism, the theory accentuates 
self-interest as an agent’s primary motive.  However, individuals routinely execute economic 
based decisions in a selfless manner, such as donating time and money toward charitable causes 
(Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000).   
Bounded willpower reflects individuals’ inability to execute decisions that maximize long 
term interests.  This property summarizes a pervasive human characteristic that despite self-
awareness, many people have difficulty executing short-term self-control in order to sustain 
long-term benefits (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000).  For example, consider physically inactive 
individuals that enroll in recurring monthly gym memberships only to visit the gym a limited 
number of times upon initial enrollment, but deliberately continue to pay periodic membership 
dues in hopes that maintaining the gym membership will motivate them to exercise.  Such 
individuals have bounded willpower as they are aware that they need to execute one of two 
actions, either frequent the gym to exercise for long-term health benefits or relinquish the gym 
membership to stop paying recurring costs for a product they are not utilizing, but fail to perform 
either action.  These three key properties have led to the development of various behavioral 
economic theories, such as social norms theory and prospect theory, which have successfully 
explicated occurrences of inefficient markets and market failures (Arrow, 1971; Elster, 1989; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991).  
Social Norms Theory 
As the underlying foundation for social norms theory, social norms are emotional and 
behavioral predispositions of individuals, as economic agents, that contribute to both the subfield 
of behavioral economics, and the greater economics discipline (Elster, 1989).  Social norms 
theory explicates human behavior in an economic setting and is a direct contrast to traditional 
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neo-classical economics founded on rational action and self-interest.  Rational actions are 
concerned with outcomes and are motivated by specific conditional future results.  Contrariwise, 
social norms are stimulated by beliefs that are either fully unconditional, or conditional without a 
desired future goal (Elster, 1989).  For a norm to be social and sustainable, the belief must be 
shared by other people and the violation of the belief must be penalized through sanctions, often 
in the form of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, or shame (Azar, 2005a; Elster, 1989).  Particularly 
effective social norms are internalized, leading to adherence even in situations where a violation 
would not be observed or subjected to sanctions by an external party (Elster, 1989).  
Psychologists assert that social norms can activate strong emotional responses and that 
conformity to gain acceptance by others is the primary incentive for individuals to adhere to 
these accepted rules of society (Aronson, Wilson & Akert, 1999, p. 294; Elster, 1989).  As a 
result, it is common for a member of society to adhere and conform to a social norm at the 
expense of violating either self-interest or rationality.  
 One of the seminal applications of social norms theory in applied research was conducted 
by Perkins and Berkowitz (1986) who utilized social norms in a study that investigated the 
influence of social norms on alcohol consumption by undergraduate students.  Shortly after the 
publication of this applied study, Elster (1989) wrote a formative paper summarizing academic 
thought on social norms and economic theory prevailing at that period.  In addition to explicitly 
defining social norms, Elster (1989) contrasted social norms with related phenomena such as 
moral norms, legal norms, and private norms.  Moral norms are consequentialist, adherence to 
legal norms are motivated by self-interest to avoid prosecution, and private norms are self-
imposed restrictions to overcome willpower deficiencies.  Other scholars have reaffirmed the 
distinct differences among these related norms including Bicchieri (2006) who asserted that 
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“what needs to be stressed here is that what makes something a social or a moral norm is our 
attitude toward it.’’ (2006, p. 21) and that “social norms by and large apply to situations in which 
there is conflict between selfish and pro-social incentives’’ (2006, p. 34).  Although Elster argues 
for the applicability of social norms theory over traditional economic theory under certain 
circumstances, he acknowledges that there are situations where economic agents succumb to 
influences from both rationality and social norms.  Elster summarizes this argument by stating 
that there are times where “rationality acts as a constraint on social norms” (1989, p. 101) and 
“conversely, social norm can act as a constraint on rationality” (1989, p. 101). 
Since Elster’s (1989) seminal paper, social norms theory has served as the theoretical 
underpinning for research in an array of fields including business ethics, accounting, economics, 
and finance (Blay, Gooden, Mellon, & Stevens, 2018) and has been particularly utilized in 
tipping research (Azar, 2004b, 2005a, 2007b; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1997; Lynn, 2006a; Lynn 
& Graves, 1996; Whaley, Douglas, & O’Neil, 2014).  The norm of tipping is a belief shared by 
many people in society that has been sustained for generations dating as far back as the 16th 
century (Azar, 2004a).  One of the primary motivations for a guest to voluntarily tip at a 
restaurant is the propensity for the general dining population to leave a tip after each meal (Azar, 
2005a).  For some guests, this is the exclusive motive for leaving a voluntary tip, thereby 
characterizing voluntary tipping behavior as unconditional on services rendered.  There are other 
types of guests, such as travelers, that voluntarily tip conditional on services received but without 
regard for future benefit as they do not have any revisit intentions.  These examples illustrate the 
validity of designating tipping as a social norm, rather than a moral, legal, or private norm. 
Principally, the restaurant tipping transaction is either unconditional or conditional without a 
desired future goal.  To further support the assertion of tipping as a social norm, tipping 
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researchers have found evidence that complying with this behavior can result in psychological 
utility, while violating this practice can result in psychological disutility (Azar, 2003, 2004b, 
2005a).  Psychological utility from tipping can take the form of positive emotions generated 
from impressing others, positive sentiments experienced from responding to empathy for a hard-
working server who earns a low wage, and enhancements to self-image through actions of 
generosity and kindness (Azar, 2005a).   
Contemporaneous to psychology utility, psychological disutility, stemming from internal 
or external sources (Azar, 2004b), can occur from not tipping through visceral responses such as 
guilt and embarrassment (Azar, 2003; Lynn et al., 1993).  As tipping is not an anonymous 
activity, external sources of disutility exist and include other market agents capable of 
identifying a guest that neglects to tip, such as others in the guest’s party and restaurant servers.  
Pressure from external agents surfaces most often in the form of social pressure (Azar, 2007a).  
Some guests will voluntarily tip notwithstanding experiencing poor service quality, albeit in 
smaller amounts (Lynn, 2009), to seek social approval (Crespi, 1947; Lynn, 2001; Whaley et al., 
2014).  Psychological disutility originating from internal sources appear in the cultivation of 
negative emotions such as guilt, embarrassment, and unfairness.  Irrespective of source, guests 
who experience psychological disutility from failing to tip may attempt to mitigate negative 
sentiments through self-justification that self-interest supersedes social norms. 
 In Azar’s (2005a) seminal paper on tipping and social welfare, he presented a theoretical 
economic model that incorporated social norms and emotional reactions as sources of agent 
utility and found that the social norm of tipping increases social welfare, the total utility of all 
agents within an economic market. Three agents (guest, restaurant, and server) interact in two 
separate transactions within the economic market of restaurant dining.  The first transaction 
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involves guest and restaurant, while the second transaction involves guest and server.  To 
determine social welfare, the utilities of all three agents are aggregated.  Restaurant utility is the 
difference between the cash inflows received from guests and the cost to render all products and 
services.  Server utility is equal to total income received through gainful employment, 
specifically the sum of direct wages received from the restaurant and tips received from guests.  
Guest utility is equal to the value of the dining experience, composed of both tangible menu 
items and intangible services, less the total cost to dine.  From a standard economics perspective, 
each agent, motivated primarily by self-interest, will strive to exhaust his/her own utility and 
subsequently maximize social welfare within the market.   
Azar (2005a) asserts that social welfare is increased by expanding the standard economic 
utility calculation of the guest to include both psychological utility and psychological disutility 
derived from tipping.  Combining social norms, the economic transaction of tipping, and agent 
utility, social welfare of a restaurant economic market can be summarized as follows: motivated 
by the social norm of tipping, a guest that tips will subsequently increase his/her utility through 
positive emotions generated from this act of generosity resulting in amplified social welfare. 
Equity Theory 
Researchers extensively utilize equity theory, a general theory of social behavior 
(Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973), to elucidate guest adherence to the social norm of 
restaurant tipping (Koku & Savas, 2016; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Lynn & Graves, 1996; Lynn 
& Sturman, 2010; Synder, 1976).  Focusing on outcomes, equity theory posits that people tend to 
treat others equitably, even at a cost to themselves.  Equity is achieved, and an outcome is judged 
as fair, when an individual’s input to output ratio is comparatively equal to the input to output 
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ratio of others (Adams, 1965; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997; Walster et al., 1973).  
An equitable relationship can be expressed in the following formula (Adams, 1965):  
𝑂/
𝐼/
=
𝑂1
𝐼1
 
Where OA and OB represent the outcomes of person A and person B respectively, and IA and IB 
represent the inputs of person A and person B respectively.  Equity theory is closely related to 
norms of fairness and norms of reciprocity as all three of these concepts suggest that in a 
relationship, people will increase inputs as outputs increase (Lynn & Sturman, 2010; Walster et 
al., 1973).  Norms of fairness are based on an individual’s internal sense of fairness (Conlin, 
Lynn, & O’Donoghue, 2003), while norms of reciprocity obligate a person to return favors 
received from others (Elster, 1989; Gouldner, 1960).   
An early empirical study of tipping in North America utilized the diffusion of 
responsibility, a psychological theory, as its theoretical underpinning to explicate a statistically 
significant negative relationship between tipping rate and party size (Freeman, Walker, Borden, 
& Latané, 1975).  Synder (1976) promptly responded with a small follow up study to argue that 
rather than using the diffusion of responsibility, the statistically significant results in Freeman et 
al.’s (1975) experiment are better explained by equity theory.  Since Synder’s (1976) 
introduction of equity theory into restaurant tipping literature, this theoretical framework has 
been repeatedly used in voluntary tipping studies.  Lynn and Grassman (1990) used this 
framework to test hypotheses connecting tipping rate to a multitude of variables, including 
service quality, bill size, patronage frequency, group size, alcohol consumption, number of 
courses, and food quality, to conclude that equitable relationships between servers and guests 
was a significant motivator for tipping.  Lynn and Graves (1996) identified that the small sample 
size in Lynn and Grassman’s (1990) investigation is a critical limitation and sought to replicate 
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the study.  Despite reporting weak significant relationships, the replication study successfully 
reproduced results, thereby contributing to the literature by increasing the generalizability of the 
original Lynn and Grassman (1990) study.  Other empirical studies that evaluated the 
applicability of equity theory to restaurant tipping include Lynn’s (2001) meta-analysis, Lynn 
and Sturman’s (2010) within-subjects experiment, and McAdams and von Massow’s (2017) 
mixed-methods investigation.  
Responding empathetically to perceived violations of fairness, low server wage has been 
identified as a motivator for guests to voluntarily tip servers as a means to increase server 
compensation (Azar, 2004b; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999; Crespi, 1947; Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & 
Graves, 1996).  Tipping, as an act of generosity and kindness, increases guest psychological 
utility through improvements to self-image and positive sentiments realized by responding to 
empathy for poorly compensated servers (Azar, 2005a).  Researchers have previously 
investigated variations of fairness norms as predictors of tipping rate (Conlin et al., 2003; Lynn, 
2008; Lynn & Graves, 1996).  Designating tipping as an input and psychological utility as an 
output, a hypothesized relationship between low server wage and tipping rate is supported by 
equity theory as people routinely incur costs to enforce norms of fairness (Bosse & Phillips, 
2016; Lynn & Graves, 1996).   
One of the earliest known studies of tipping employing a scientific approach was 
conducted by Crespi (1947) who was astounded that social psychologists at the time had not 
begun researching the tipping phenomenon in the United States.  The underlying premise for 
Crespi’s (1947) study was conflicting perspectives of the American public regarding the role of 
tipping in society.  The July 15, 1946 Life magazine editorial of the week determined that tipping 
was loathed nationally and should be abolished, while an April 12, 1947 Gallup poll found 
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support for tipping as 49% of Americans nationally, 55% of Americans in urban areas, and 65% 
of Philadelphians believed in the practice (Crespi, 1947).  Crespi asserted that the conflicting 
attitudes and perspectives of tipping were due to a lack of scientific research resulting in a need 
to refer to unreliable “unsystematic personal observation” (Crespi, 1947, p. 425).  Identifying 
imprecise wording used in the unsystematic surveys, Crespi posited that participants confounded 
tipping with fair wages, resulting in conflicting conclusions regarding attitudes toward the 
tipping phenomenon.  To address this issue, Crespi included the following question in the survey 
used for his empirical study, “If service workers were given fair wages for their work, do you 
think that tipping should be eliminated?”  A majority 69.7% of respondents answered yes to this 
question and combined with the other study results, Crespi contended that Americans tipped 
primarily to avoid social disapproval, tipping should be eliminated, and that service workers 
should be paid a fair wage directly from their employers.  Subsequent to this seminal study, 
research in tipping remained largely sparse over the next thirty years before becoming 
progressively more popular.  However, seven decades after Crespi’s seminal study, a gap in the 
literature regarding the relationship between direct wage income and tip income remains 
unfilled.  As economic agents will enforce fairness to maintain equitable relationships when 
possible, (Azar, 2005b; Bosse & Phillips, 2016; Lynn & Graves, 1996; Lynn & Sturman, 2010), 
it is expected that an inverse relationship exists between the minimum server wage and tipping 
rate.   
H1: Tipping rate is higher when the minimum server wage is low versus when the 
minimum server wage is high.   
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Service Quality 
A multitude of variables have been investigated as predictors of voluntary tipping 
behavior, including service quality, bill size, party size, server gender, physical appearance of 
server, and patronage frequency (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999; Gueguen & Jacob, 2011; Jacob, 
Gueguen, Boulbry, & Ardiccioni, 2010; Lynn, 2003, 2006b; Snyder, 1976).  Among these 
variables, the influence of service quality on voluntary tipping rate has been especially studied 
(Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Whaley et al., 2014) as voluntary 
tipping provides servers with a tangible incentive to deliver high levels of service quality 
(Hemenway, 1993; Lynn et al., 1993; Miller, 2010).  Service quality is an appraisal conducted by 
comparing anticipated service with perceptions of actual service received (Grönroos, 1982; 
Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1985).  Perceived service quality is a customer’s discernment 
of the overall superiority of a service encounter (Kivela, Inbakaran, & Reece, 1999; Zeithaml, 
1988).  Guests use indicators such as server appearance, promptness, friendliness, service 
accuracy, menu knowledge, and attentiveness to evaluate perceived service quality delivered by 
servers (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994, 1999; Lynn, 2003; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Lynn & 
Graves, 1996; Lynn & Simons, 2010; Whaley et al., 2014).   
High service quality delivery requires the co-creation of value through the server-guest 
dyadic relationship (Vargo & Lusch, 2004) and subsequently requires a high degree of 
customization necessitating servers to treat different guests differently (Mayser & von 
Wangenheim, 2013).  The intangible nature of service quality makes it difficult for restaurant 
managers to monitor, evaluate, and control the level of service quality delivered by servers 
(Azar, 2005b; Ogbonna & Harris, 2002; Lynn & McCall, 2000; Seiders & Berry, 1998; Shamir, 
1983, 1984; Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1988).  Voluntary tipping is a mechanism for 
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restaurant managers to address challenges associated with regulating service quality, as this 
tipping policy is an economically efficient method of monitoring and rewarding servers for effort 
exerted (Azar, 2005b; Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Hemenway, 1993; Jacob & Page, 1980), 
provided that the reward is based on service quality (Miller, 2010).  Economic efficiency is 
achieved as servers are incentivized with the potential reward of a voluntary tip to deliver high 
levels of service quality.  In addition, voluntary tipping is a mechanism for servers to receive 
immediate performance feedback.  Allowing guests to directly contribute to a server’s total 
income lowers a restaurant’s labor cost through reduced direct wages and supervision expenses 
(Hemenway, 1993; Miller, 2010).   
Research has found evidence that service quality positively influences guest intentions, 
attitudes, and satisfaction (Andaleeb & Conway, 2006; Arora & Singer, 2006; Kivela et al., 
1999).  However, investigations into the effect of service quality on tipping rate have provided 
mixed results with some research finding support for significant influence (Bodvarsson, 
Luksetich, & McDermott, 2003; Lynn & Grassman, 1990; Lynn & Graves, 1996; Mok & 
Hansen, 1999), while other studies finding insignificant relationships between the two variables 
(Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Crespi, 1947; Lynn & Latané, 1984; May, 1980).  Using fourteen 
tipping studies, Lynn (2001) conducted a meta-analysis to find a positive influence of service 
quality on tipping rate.  However, the meta-analysis yielded a small effect inferring that, 
notwithstanding the presence of positive influence, servers may not discern an increase in tips 
resulting from a larger exertion of effort to improve service quality.  Therefore, voluntary tipping 
may not provide servers with a strong incentive to deliver high levels of service (Lynn, 2001; 
Lynn & Graves, 1996).   
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Equity theory can be applied to the restaurant tipping phenomenon by designating 
voluntary tip as an input and service quality as an output.  Considering service quality in 
isolation, a positive relationship between service quality and tipping rate is expected as people 
will generally increase inputs as outputs increase (Lynn & Sturman, 2010; Walster et al., 1973).   
H2: Tipping rate is higher when service quality is high versus when service quality is 
low. 
However, when service quality is considered in combination with the minimum server 
wage, the input to output ratio equation changes as the minimum server wage is designated as an 
input alongside the voluntary tip.  The inclusion of additional inputs may assist in explicating the 
varied results of statistical significance and effect size of the influence of service quality on 
tipping rate found in prior research.  When the minimum server wage is low, guests may 
perceive that the input to output ratio of servers is not appropriate and will equalize the ratio by 
tipping regardless of service quality, resulting in a non-significant effect of service quality on 
tipping rate.  Contrariwise, when the minimum server wage is high, guests may perceive a more 
appropriate baseline input to output ratio.  As a result, service quality will have a significant 
effect on tipping rate as a higher output from the receipt of higher service quality will warrant a 
higher input in the form of a higher tipping rate.  
H3: The effect of service quality on tipping rate differs for different minimum server 
wage conditions.  Specifically, when the minimum server wage is low, service 
quality will not affect tipping rate.  When the minimum server wage is high, 
tipping rate is higher when service quality is high versus when service quality is 
low.  
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Perceived Fairness 
Fairness is a judgment of the reasonableness and justness of a process or outcome and 
within a restaurant context, perceived fairness is a guest’s appraisal that the total cost and 
benefits of an overall dining experience are commensurate for all agents; guest, restaurant, and 
server (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Studies have found that perceived 
fairness can significantly influence customer outcomes, such as satisfaction and loyalty 
(Lindenmeier & Tscheulin, 2008; Oliver & Swan, 1989; Shoemaker, 2003), and behavioral 
intentions, such as purchase and repurchase intentions (Choi & Mattila, 2006; Grewal, Monroe, 
& Krishnan, 1998; Haws & Bearden, 2006; Taylor & Kimes, 2010; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2004).  
Consumers are less likely to patronize firms perceived to conduct business unfairly, with some 
customers electing to punish unfair firms by deliberately incurring additional costs to 
themselves, such as travelling further, to patronize a competitor (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 
1986a, 1986b; Kimes & Wirtz, 2002).  Similarly, a customer may decline purchasing a product 
or service from an unfair firm despite suffering from foregoing the purchase (Rabin, 1998).  
Perceived fairness is exceptionally relevant in service based transactions, such as restaurant 
purchases, as a substantial portion of service industry value offerings are intangible, making it 
difficult for guests to directly appraise the quality of purchases (Gundlach & Murphy 1993; 
Mayser & von Wagenheim, 2013; Seiders & Berry, 1998).   
Since the world’s first minimum wage laws were enacted in Australia and New Zealand 
in the 1890s, economists have debated whether such regulations attain underlying objectives of 
alleviating poverty through increased employment, income, and productivity (Kaufman, 2009).  
Using a simple competitive labor market model, early opponents of labor market regulation 
posited that a minimum wage leads to fewer jobs, higher prices, lower profits, and lower overall 
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wages (Mincer, 1976; Stigler, 1946).  Subsequent research postulated that in focused 
monopsonistic labor markets, a minimum wage can increase economic efficiency and fairness 
(Card & Krueger, 1995).  When incorporating social cost into a monopsonistic labor market 
model, economic efficiency and fairness improvements can extend into general competitive labor 
markets by eliminating social tax on labor and removing hidden social subsidies (Kaufman, 
2009).  As the restaurant labor market is large, competitive, and growing (Andaleeb & Conway, 
2006; Bills, 1999), these more recent economic viewpoints that a minimum wage increases 
fairness may apply to a restaurant setting.   
It is expected that a positive relationship exists between the minimum server wage and 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and that an inverse relationship exists between 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and tipping rate.  As a result, when the minimum 
server wage is low, perceived fairness of minimum server wage will be lower and guests will 
subsequently equalize the unfair situation through a higher tipping rate.  Contrariwise, when the 
minimum server wage is high, perceived fairness of the minimum server wage will be higher and 
subsequently, tipping rate will be lower.  These relationships suggest that perceived fairness of 
the minimum server wage mediates the effect of minimum server wage on tipping rate as shown 
in Figure 1.  
H4: The negative effect of the minimum server wage on tipping rate is mediated by 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage.  Specifically, the minimum server 
wage has a positive effect on perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage has a negative effect on tipping 
rate. 
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Figure 1. Proposed conceptual mediation model of the indirect effect of the minimum server 
wage on tipping rate via perceived fairness of the minimum server wage.   
 
As receipt of high service quality equates to high output, guests would need to increase 
input, in the form of tipping rate, in order to equalize the input to output ratio as posited by 
equity theory.  As voluntary tipping is a mechanism for guests to equalize relationships with 
servers for delivering higher levels of service quality, it is expected that a positive relationship 
exists between service quality and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  In addition, it is 
expected that a positive relationship exists between perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and 
tipping rate as guests who believe that voluntary tipping is unfair will tip less, while those that 
believe that voluntary tipping is a fair mechanism to increase server income will tip more.  
Combining these two expected relationships, it is postulated that perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping mediates the effect of service quality on tipping rate as shown in Figure 2. 
H5: The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by perceived 
fairness of voluntary tipping.  Specifically, service quality has a positive effect on 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
has a positive effect on tipping rate. 
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Figure 2. Proposed conceptual mediation model of the indirect effect of service quality on 
tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  
 
Combining the expected inverse relationship between the minimum server wage and 
tipping rate in hypothesis 1 with the proposed mediation model in hypothesis 5, it is postulated 
that the relationship between perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and tipping rate will vary as 
a function of the minimum server wage resulting in second stage moderated mediation as showed 
in Figure 3. 
H6: The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect 
effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
H6a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping will be stronger when the minimum server wage is higher versus 
when the minimum server wage is lower.  
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Figure 3. Proposed conceptual second stage moderated mediation model of the moderation of the 
minimum server wage on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived 
fairness of voluntary tipping. 
 
Over a 30-year period from the 1980s to the 2000s, an abundance of attitudinal surveys of 
guest opinions of restaurant tipping have been conducted in the United States (Lynn, 2017b; 
Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  The majority of these surveys indicate that guests prefer that servers 
earn a guaranteed wage rather than receive tip income while also preferring voluntary tipping to 
automatic service charge (Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  Lynn and Withiam (2008) suggested that a 
preference for servers to earn a guaranteed wage over earning tip income infers that guests prefer 
service inclusive pricing to voluntary tipping.  However, when taking into consideration that the 
majority of guests also prefer voluntary tipping over automatic service charge, and inconsistent 
questionnaire wording, it is possible that guests have confounded perceived fairness of server 
compensation with perceived fairness of tipping policy in these attitudinal consumer surveys.  
The popularity and prevalence of attitudinal surveys on guest opinions of restaurant tipping have 
continued past the 2000s and since 2012, the most common platform for conducting such polls 
have transitioned to online mediums such as Google Consumer Surveys, SurveyMonkey, Trip 
Advisor, and Zagat (Lynn, 2017b).  Lynn (2017b) recognized that incongruent wording and 
uncertain sampling methodology employed in these online surveys limit the utility of results, 
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leading him to conduct his own survey of whether restaurant guests like or dislike different 
tipping policies.  Interestingly, Lynn’s (2017b) attitudinal survey found that voluntary tipping is 
most liked, followed by service inclusive pricing, and finally automatic service charge is least 
liked.  However, as Lynn’s (2017b) survey was conducted using an unrepresentative sample of 
the US population, the generalizability of results is limited.   
Surprisingly, notwithstanding the abundance of attitudinal surveys on guest preference 
and favorability of different tipping policies, there is only one published study that investigated 
perceived fairness of tipping policy.  This study discretely compared voluntary tipping to 
automatic service charge and voluntary tipping to service inclusive pricing, finding that 
voluntary tipping was perceived to be fairer than either compulsory tipping policy (Lynn & 
Wang, 2013).  Lynn and Wang (2013) speculated that voluntary tipping is perceived to be fairer 
as it provides guests with voice and control while directly rewarding servers for effort exerted.  
In addition, Lynn and Wang (2013) suggested that future research should investigate whether 
empathy increases perceived fairness of compulsory tipping.  Considering the incongruent results 
from guest attitudinal surveys indicating a preference for servers to receive constant income, 
rather than tip income, and a preference for voluntary tipping (Lynn & Withiam, 2008), it is 
expected that the minimum server wage influences perceived fairness of a tipping policy.  This 
dissertation will build on Lynn and Wang’s (2013) findings on perceived fairness of tipping 
policy by taking the minimum server wage into consideration.  It is expected that when the 
minimum server wage is low, voluntary tipping, as a form of voluntary pricing, is perceived to 
be fairer than compulsory tipping as guests are able to supplement a lower minimum server wage 
with a higher tipping rate.  Conversely, when the minimum server wage is high, compulsory 
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tipping is perceived to be fairer than voluntary tipping as a higher minimum server wage will not 
need to be supplemented. 
H7: The effect of tipping policy on perceived fairness of tipping policy differs for 
different minimum server wage conditions.  Specifically, when the minimum 
server wage rate is low, voluntary tipping is perceived to be fairer than 
compulsory tipping.  When the minimum server wage is high, compulsory tipping 
is to be perceived fairer than voluntary tipping. 
Empathy 
Tipping research has found that voluntary tipping is perceived to be fairer than both 
automatic service charge and service inclusive pricing (Lynn & Wang, 2013).  As voluntary 
tipping provides a means for guests to directly reward servers, thereby enforcing equity in 
server-guest exchanges, Lynn and Wang (2013) suggested that perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping may be even greater for guests with higher levels of empathy.  Although this explanation 
is grounded in a prior study, Lynn (2009), Lynn and Wang (2013) recognized that the data 
presented in their perceived fairness study cannot directly support this conclusion and therefore 
requires further testing.  In the referenced study, Lynn (2009) investigated fourteen self-
attributed motives for tipping, and subsequent to a factor analysis, a factor labeled “intrinsic 
motives” was identified.  Intrinsic motives was found to have the most significant influence on 
tipping rate in a succeeding binominal logistic regression.   
It is postulated that a positive relationship exists between service quality and empathy as 
guests will feel more sympathetic towards servers working harder to deliver higher levels of 
service quality.  In addition, it is anticipated that a positive relationship exists between empathy 
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and tipping rate.  Accordingly, it is expected that empathy mediates the effect of service quality 
on tipping rate as shown in Figure 4. 
H8: The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by empathy.  
Specifically, service quality has a positive effect on empathy and empathy has a 
positive effect on tipping rate. 
 
Figure 4. Proposed conceptual mediation model of the indirect effect of service quality on 
tipping rate via empathy.  
 
Combining the anticipated inverse relationship between the minimum server wage and 
tipping rate in hypothesis 1 with the proposed mediation model in hypothesis 8, it is expected 
that the relationship between empathy and tipping rate will vary as a function of the minimum 
server wage resulting in second stage moderated mediation as shown in Figure 5.  
H9: The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect 
effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy. 
H9a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy will be stronger 
when the minimum server wage is lower versus when the minimum server wage is 
higher. 
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Figure 5. Proposed conceptual second stage moderated mediation model of the moderation of the 
minimum server wage on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy. 
 
Perceived Value 
Defined as the degree of perceived quality relative to price (Fornell, Johnson Anderson, 
Cha, & Bryant, 1996; Oh, 2000; Qin & Prybutok, 2008; Zeithaml, 1988), perceived value has 
significant relationships with essential restaurant marketing variables, including customer 
satisfaction and behavioral intentions (Qin & Prybutok, 2008; Ryu, Han, & Kim, 2008; Ryu, 
Lee, & Kim, 2012).  As a strong determinant of the American Customer Satisfaction Index 
(ASCI), a market based performance measure (Fornell et at., 1996), guest perceptions of value 
are important to restaurants.  Perceived value is a robust construct facilitating increased 
comparability of firm performance by controlling for differences in customer income levels and 
budget constraints (Fornell et al., 1996; Lancaster, 1971).   
As previously discussed, nominal restaurant prices are discrete pricing components, such 
as explicit menu prices and implicit voluntary tips, that aggregate to a restaurant’s real price, the 
total cost to dine (Lynn, 2006a; Lynn & Withiam, 2008).  The tipping phenomenon affords 
restaurants the ability to separate distinct components of value offerings, specifically the tangible 
food product component and the intangible service delivery component.  Information processing 
research has found that consumer discernment of multi attribute options is influenced by the 
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evaluability of individual attributes (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blout, & Bazerman, 1999).  As nominal 
prices are assigned to each of these discrete components, restaurants have a choice between a 
partition pricing strategy and a bundle pricing strategy.  Partition pricing is fully exemplified in a 
voluntary tipping policy as nominal prices for tangible food and drink products manifest as menu 
item prices, while voluntary tips represent nominal prices for intangible service delivery.  
Analogously, under an automatic service charge tipping policy, menu item prices represent 
tangible food and drink products, while automatic service charges represent intangible service 
delivery.  Automatic service charge is a form of transparent bundle pricing as the nominal prices 
for tangible and intangible value offerings are interlinked but distinguishable.  Service inclusive 
pricing is an opaque form of bundle pricing, as the tangible and intangible restaurant value 
offerings are amalgamated into a single indistinguishable price (Lynn & Wang, 2013; Lynn & 
Withiam, 2008; Morwitz, Greenleaf, & Johnson, 1998; Wang & Lynn, 2017).   
As a pricing mechanism, tipping can influence various guest perceptions, including 
perceived expensiveness, perceived quality, and deal perception (Lynn & Wang, 2013; Wang & 
Lynn, 2017).  Lynn and Wang (2013) investigated perceived expensiveness of different tipping 
policies to find that service inclusive pricing is perceived to be more expensive than voluntary 
tipping.  Wang and Lynn (2017) investigated variations of automatic service charge and service 
inclusive pricing relative to a base tipping rate of 15%, to find differences in deal perception 
arising from specific manipulations of these variables.  The findings from these studies suggest 
that tipping policy can affect guest attitudes and perceptions towards restaurant purchases.  
Notwithstanding economic equivalence of two outcomes, consumer purchase perceptions 
can vary significantly contingent on the framing of outcomes against a reference point 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  When comparing partition and bundle pricing options, a bias 
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towards an anchor evaluation has been found in consumer assessments (Morwitz et al., 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Yadav, 1994).  Tversky and Kahneman (1974) describe this 
phenomenon as adjustment and anchoring, whereby consumer evaluations are conducted 
sequentially by first anchoring on a base price followed by making upward adjustments for 
surcharges and supplemental fees.  As customers are ordinarily initially presented with a base 
price followed by additional surcharges, the base price is perceived to be the most important 
(Morwitz et al., 1998).   
In restaurant dining situations, guests are presented with nominal explicit food and drink 
prices on a menu that are accordingly held as base prices, while tips and taxes are nominal 
implicit prices held as upward adjustments (Lynn & Wang, 2013; Wang & Lynn, 2017).  When 
anchoring and adjusting, consumers have a tendency to make an insufficient upward adjustment 
for surcharges (Morwitz et al., 1998).  As a result, holding all nominal prices constant, guests 
may perceive the real price of a restaurant purchase as lower when presented with partition 
pricing versus when presented with bundle pricing.  A difference in perceived price successively 
leads to a difference in perceived value.  Holding the absolute values of nominal prices for both 
tangible and intangible restaurant value offerings constant, it is anticipated that guest perceptions 
of value will be higher when presented with partition pricing versus when presented with bundle 
pricing.  Correspondingly, it is expected that perceived value of voluntary tipping will be higher 
than perceived value of compulsory tipping.  In addition, as customer judgments of multi 
attribute alternatives are affected by degree of evaluability of each alternative (Hsee et al., 1999), 
it is expected that the level of transparency of a bundle price will influence perceived value.  
Respectively, it is anticipated that perceived value of automatic service charge will be higher 
than perceived value of service inclusive pricing. 
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H10: Perceived value varies for different tipping policies.  Specifically, perceived value 
of voluntary tipping is higher than perceived value of compulsory tipping and 
perceived value of automatic service charge is higher than perceived value of 
service inclusive pricing. 
Familiarity 
Familiarity is a consumer’s degree of prior knowledge about a product or service 
accumulated from previous experiences (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Park & Lessig, 1981) and 
increases after repeatedly experiencing analogous transactions (McGuire & Kimes, 2006). 
Restaurant pricing research has found that familiarity with pricing techniques, such as revenue 
management practices, has a strong influence on perceptions of price fairness (Kimes, 2008; 
McGuire & Kimes, 2006; Taylor & Kimes, 2010; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007).  As previously 
described, voluntary tipping allows restaurants to offer lower nominal menu prices, automatic 
service charge adds a supplemental nominal price for service, and service inclusive pricing 
increases nominal menu prices.  Subsequently, a chosen tipping policy will have pricing 
implications and similar to other restaurant pricing considerations, guest perceptions of fairness 
may be influenced by familiarity with a specific tipping policy.  Since the introduction of tipping 
in the United States at the turn of the 20th century, voluntary tipping has been ubiquitously 
associated with restaurant dining (Azar, 2004a; Wang & Lynn, 2017).  Conversely, automatic 
service charge and service inclusive pricing are comparatively newer forms of tipping.  As a 
result, guests have may have differing levels of familiarity with each tipping policy.  Initial 
perceptions of unfairness of a novel and unfamiliar practice tend to decline over time as the 
custom becomes established into community norms and consumers develop familiarity (Kimes, 
1994; Kimes & Noone, 2002; McGuire & Kimes, 2006; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007).   
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It is postulated that familiarity with voluntary tipping moderates the relationship between 
service quality and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  It is expected that higher levels of 
familiarity with voluntary tipping will strengthen the relationship between service quality and 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping, while lower voluntary tipping familiarity will weaken the 
relationship, resulting in first stage moderated mediation as shown in Figure 6.  
H11: Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation of the indirect 
effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  
H11a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping will be stronger when voluntary tipping familiarity is higher 
versus when voluntary tipping familiarity is lower. 
 
Figure 6. Proposed conceptual first stage moderated mediation model of the moderation of 
voluntary tipping policy familiarity on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
 
Combining hypothesis 6 and hypothesis 11 together results in moderated moderated 
mediation of the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping as showed in Figure 7.   
H12: Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation and the 
minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect effect 
of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
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Figure 7. Proposed conceptual moderated moderated mediation model of the first stage 
moderation of voluntary tipping familiarity and the second stage moderation of the minimum 
server wage on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping.  
 
Research Hypotheses 
 The research hypotheses of this dissertation are summarized as follows: 
H1: Tipping rate is higher when the minimum server wage is low versus when the minimum 
server wage is high.   
H2: Tipping rate is higher when service quality is high versus when service quality is low. 
H3: The effect of service quality on tipping rate differs for different minimum server wage 
conditions.  Specifically, when the minimum server wage is low, service quality will not 
affect tipping rate.  When the minimum server wage is high, tipping rate is higher when 
service quality is high versus when service quality is low.  
H4: The negative effect of the minimum server wage on tipping rate is mediated by perceived 
fairness of the minimum server wage.  Specifically, the minimum server wage has a 
positive effect on perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and perceived fairness 
of the minimum server wage has a negative effect on tipping rate. 
H5: The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping.  Specifically, service quality has a positive effect on perceived fairness 
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of voluntary tipping and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping has a positive effect on 
tipping rate. 
H6: The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect effect of 
service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
H6a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping will be stronger when the minimum server wage is higher versus when the 
minimum server wage is lower. 
H7: The effect of tipping policy on perceived fairness of tipping policy differs for different 
minimum server wage conditions.  Specifically, when the minimum server wage rate is 
low, voluntary tipping is perceived to be fairer than compulsory tipping.  When the 
minimum server wage is high, compulsory tipping is to be perceived fairer than voluntary 
tipping. 
H8: The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by empathy.  
Specifically, service quality has a positive effect on empathy and empathy has a positive 
effect on tipping rate. 
H9: The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect effect of 
service quality on tipping rate via empathy. 
H9a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy will be stronger when 
the minimum server wage is lower versus when the minimum server wage is higher. 
H10: Perceived value varies for different tipping policies.  Specifically, perceived value of 
voluntary tipping is higher than perceived value of compulsory tipping and perceived 
value of automatic service charge is higher than perceived value of service inclusive 
pricing. 
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H11: Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation of the indirect effect of 
service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
H11a: The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping will be stronger when voluntary tipping familiarity is higher versus when 
voluntary tipping familiarity is lower. 
H12: Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation and the minimum server 
wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect effect of service quality on 
tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
Summary 
 This chapter reviewed literature relevant to resolving the research questions comprising 
this dissertation.  The variables of interest, theoretical background, and research hypotheses were 
presented.  Chapter Three presents the design and methodology of this research.   
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CHAPTER THREE  
RESEARCH METHODS 
 This chapter presents the research methods composed of research design, data collection, 
and analyses, used to resolve the research questions.  Two separate studies utilizing online 
scenario based experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses and achieve the research 
objectives.  Study One focused on tipping behavior and guest responses under a voluntary 
tipping policy, while Study Two examined different tipping policies in varying combinations 
with minimum server wage.   
Experimental Design Overview 
Experiments are a research method that allow researchers to exert influence over 
conditions to manipulate variables of interest for the purpose of hypothesis testing (Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 12; Zikmund, 2003, p. 257).  An experiment involves applying 
different treatments to either different groups of subjects or repeatedly to the same subjects, and 
subsequently measuring the performance of the treatments.  Treatment conditions are 
purposefully selected and controlled to permit the researcher to attribute observed differences to 
specific variables, facilitating the inference of causal relationships among variables (Keppel & 
Wickens, 2004, p. 2).   
There are two types of experimental designs, between-subjects design and within-
subjects design.  In a between-subjects design experiment, each subject receives only one of the 
treatment conditions.  Conversely, each subject receives every treatment condition in a within-
subjects design.  Between-subjects experiments benefit from parsimonious design, analysis 
simplicity, minimal statistical assumptions, an absence of nuance variables, and an absence of 
learning effects (Campbell & Stanley, 1966, p. 13).  However, between-subjects experimental 
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designs are less statistically sensitive.  Contrariwise, statistical tests conducted in within-subjects 
experimental designs are more sensitive as each subject receives every treatment condition 
resulting in higher comparability among the various groups.  However, there are disadvantages 
associated with within-subjects design, including more complex statistical requisite assumptions 
and potential exposure to nuance variables; variables that are not relevant to a study but 
influence experimental outcomes.  Both between-subjects and within-subjects experiments can 
have one or more independent variables, also referred to as factors.  Factorial designs are 
experiments with multiple factors where every level of each factor is combined with the level of 
every other factor.  This defining structure of factorial designs provide researchers with 
multidimensional information as the influence of each factor can be examined in addition to the 
combinational effects of independent variables taken together (Keppel & Wickens, 2004, p. 195). 
The two studies in this dissertation each incorporated two independent variables into a 
between-subjects factorial scenario design experiment.  As confounding effects and learning 
effects, commonly found in within-subjects experiments, would be difficult to control after a 
subject receives the first treatment, a between-subjects design was selected for both studies.  For 
example, suppose after answering questions regarding perceived fairness of a voluntary tipping 
policy, a participant is then asked to answer the same questions regarding perceived fairness of a 
compulsory tipping policy.  In this situation, a participant’s perception of fairness of a 
compulsory tipping policy could be influenced by how s/he answered the preceding question on 
perceived fairness of a voluntary tipping policy.  Known as order of presentation bias, this 
potential bias arises from the accumulation of experience gained through the course of 
responding to multiple treatments (Zikmund, 2003, p. 267) and results in experimental error.  To 
mitigate against low statistical sensitivity, a disadvantage of between-subjects experimental 
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design, a larger sample size was collected to ensure a sufficient effect size (Keppel & Wickens, 
2004, p. 11). 
Scenario design is an effective measure allowing researchers to control variables in 
different scenarios (Bitner, 1990).  Consequently, similar restaurant scenarios with different 
minimum server wages and different tipping policies, along with short surveys, were distributed 
to qualified participants through Qualtrics, an online survey platform.  Participants in both 
studies were provided with preliminary background information describing their assigned 
treatment condition before moving through a scenario requiring them to imagine patronizing a 
full-service restaurant for dinner.  Manipulation checks were conducted on pilot studies for both 
experiments to test for measurement accuracy and experimental validity.  
Study One 
Study One focused exclusively on voluntary tipping to investigate the effect of the 
minimum server wage, in conjunction with established antecedent variables, on tipping rate.  
Specifically, service quality, perceived fairness of the minimum server wage, perceived fairness 
of voluntary tipping, empathy, and voluntary tipping familiarity were included as variables of 
interest.  After progressing through the experiment stimuli and responding to tipping behavior 
questions, participants were presented with a set of end-of-experiment questions pertaining to 
empathy, minimum server wage preferences, tipping policy preferences, demographics, 
restaurant visitation frequency, and restaurant work experience.  These end-of-experiment 
questions assisted in identifying boundary conditions, presenting alternative explanations for 
observed effects, and describing the sample. 
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Participants 
Participants for Study One were recruited online through Qualtrics, a market research 
firm providing online panel data collection and management services (Qualtrics, 2019).  Online 
data sampling provides various advantages, including ease of facilitating random assignment of 
subjects into experimental treatments (Bujisic, Hutchinson, & Parsa, 2014) and relatively lower 
participant drop-out resulting in more complete data (Dolnicar, Laesser, & Matus, 2009).  
Subjects comprising of 630 US residents, aged 18 and over, and who dined in a restaurant at 
least once in the past month were recruited and randomly distributed among the four treatment 
groups.  The sample size of 630 ensured a minimum of 157 subjects per cell of the experimental 
design and is more than sufficient to detect a medium sized effect with a minimum power of .80 
at the .05 significance level (Cohen, 1992).  This study obtained approval from University of 
Nevada Las Vegas’ Institutional Review Board (IRB).  The IRB approval is provided in 
Appendix A and the participant informed consent form is provided in Appendix B. 
Design 
 Study One examined the effect of the minimum server wage, service quality, and the 
interaction of the minimum server wage and service quality on tipping rate using a 2 (minimum 
server wage: $2.13 per hour, $16.00 per hour) x 2 (service quality: low, high) between-subjects 
factorial experimental design.  The lowest current minimum server wage of $2.13 per hour and 
the highest current minimum server wage of $16.00 per hour in the United States were selected 
as the two minimum server wage conditions.  A pilot study using a separate sample of subjects 
was conducted to facilitate manipulation checks to test for measurement accuracy and 
experimental validity.  The experimental design is displayed in Table 1. 
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An email with a link to the online survey was sent via Qualtrics to its panels.  Participants 
were first presented with an online consent form and three screening questions inquiring about 
their country of residency, age, and dining experience in the prior month.  Qualified participants 
advanced to the survey and the restaurant scenario experiment. 
Table 1 
Study One Experimental Design  
Minimum Server Wage Service Quality 
  Low High 
$2.13 per hour 157 157 
$16.00 per hour 158 158 
 
Procedure, Stimuli, and Instrument 
The complete Study One questionnaire is provided in Appendix C.  The survey began by 
asking participants questions related to their familiarity with voluntary tipping, automatic service 
charge, and service inclusive pricing using a three item 7-point Likert type scale (Kimes & 
Wirtz, 2016; Taylor & Kimes, 2010).  These questions were intended to prepare participants for 
the restaurant dining scenario by priming their thoughts with respect to tipping.  After the tipping 
policy familiarity questions, the online experiment commenced with a detailed introduction 
explicitly stating that servers in the restaurant scenario earned the minimum server rate of either 
$2.13 per hour or $16.00 per hour, depending on the subject’s minimum server wage condition 
assignment.  Under both conditions, participants were asked to imagine visiting a hypothetical 
full-service restaurant and were presented with a restaurant stimulus consisting of an exterior 
restaurant photo, an interior restaurant photo (Lynn & Wang, 2013), and the following 
information: “Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is your 
first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum server wage, which is 
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$2.13 per hour ($16.00 per hour) in this town. You walk into the restaurant.  The hostess sees 
you walk in and greets you.  You tell her that you are dining by yourself.  The hostess seats you 
at a table and gives you a menu.” A menu stimulus consisting of drinks, appetizers, and entrées 
(Lynn & Wang, 2013) was then presented to the participants.  
Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of two service quality scenarios (low / high) 
and provided with a description of the dining experience.  The descriptions of the two service 
quality conditions were based on a past scenario based experiment with two service quality 
scenarios, positive and negative (Wall & Berry, 2007).  Wall and Berry (2007) created the 
positive and negative scenarios with assistance from a seafood restaurant chain who provided 
guidelines for the two conditions based on the company’s customer-service standards.   
The low service quality description is as follows: “Your server sees you sit down but 
does not immediately greet you.  A few minutes after you finish reading the menu, your server 
greets you and asks for your order.  You ask her about the ingredients in the soup of the day and 
the daily special, but she is unable to answer your questions.  You decide not to order the soup or 
the daily special.  You order an iced tea, chicken wings as an appetizer, and the spaghetti & 
meatballs.  After you finish your meal, you wait a while before your server returns.  She gives 
you the bill but does not take away any of the empty dishes.”   
The high service quality description is as follows: “Your server sees you sit down and 
immediately greets you.  After you finish reading the menu, your server returns and asks for your 
order.  You ask her about the ingredients in the soup of the day and the daily special.  She is able 
to answer all of your questions.  You order an iced tea, chicken wings as an appetizer, and the 
spaghetti & meatballs.  The server brings you the iced tea and chicken wings.  After you finish 
the chicken wings, the server brings out the spaghetti & meatballs and takes away the empty 
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chicken wings plate.  The food tastes as you expected.  Shortly after, the server returns and asks 
if you need anything else.  You ask for another napkin and she immediately brings you one.  
After you finish your meal, the server returns with your bill and takes away all the empty 
dishes.” 
Following the service quality description, all subjects were presented with a bill stimulus 
showing a pre-tax subtotal of $21.65, tax of $1.10, and a final total of $22.75.  The bill pre-tax 
total of $21.65 in the scenario was determined by inflating the 2014 full-service restaurant 
median check size of $20.00 (National Restaurant Association & Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016) 
from the December 2014 price level to the March 2019 price level, the most current available 
index, using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation calculator 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).  A sales tax rate of 5.10% was applied to the pre-tax amount 
to determine sales tax of $1.10 and a final bill total equal to $22.75.  The sales tax rate of 5.10% 
used in the scenario was determined by averaging the 2019 sales tax rates in the 50 United States 
of America and the District of Columbia (Cammenga, 2019).  Along with the bill stimulus, 
participants were provided with the following description: “You give the server a credit card and 
she returns with a mobile credit card terminal showing the following: Thank you for dining at 
Golden Mountain Restaurant.  Your bill total is $22.75.  Would you like to add a tip?”  Similar to 
contemporary restaurant electronic point of sale terminals, participants were given an option of 
entering a dollar amount tip, a percentage amount, or not entering a tip at all.  After adding an 
optional tip, perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping were assessed using a three item 7-point Likert type scale (Kimes, 1994; Taylor & 
Kimes, 2010; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007).  Subjects were then asked whether their tipping behavior 
would have deviated if they were dining with others, rather by themselves.  
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 After answering questions directly related to the scenario, participants were presented 
with manipulation check questions designed to measure experimental accuracy and validity.  
Following the manipulation check questions, respondent empathy was measured using a five 
item 7-point Likert type scale (Lynn, 2009).  The survey concluded with a set of end-of-
experiment questions concerning demographics, restaurant work experience, restaurant dining 
frequency, attitudes towards the minimum server wage, and attitudes towards tipping policy.  
Table 2 displays a list of measures used in this study.  Reliability of multi-item constructs will be 
examined and presented in Chapter Four. 
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Table 2 
Study One Measures 
Variable Measurement Source 
Voluntary tipping 
familiarity  
I am familiar with tipping servers in restaurants 
Tipping servers in restaurants is usual 
Tipping servers in restaurants is typical 
 
Kimes & Wirtz 
(2016); Taylor 
& Kimes (2010) 
 
Automatic service 
charge familiarity  
I am familiar with automatic service charges in 
restaurants 
Automatic service charges in restaurants are usual 
Automatic service charges in restaurants are 
typical 
 
Kimes & Wirtz 
(2016); Taylor 
& Kimes (2010) 
 
Service inclusive 
pricing familiarity  
I am familiar with all-inclusive pricing in 
restaurants 
All-inclusive pricing in restaurants is usual 
All-inclusive in restaurants is typical 
 
Kimes & Wirtz 
(2016); Taylor 
& Kimes (2010) 
 
Perceived fairness of 
the minimum server 
wage 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is fair 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is acceptable 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is reasonable 
 
Kimes (1994); 
Taylor & Kimes 
(2010); Wirtz & 
Kimes (2007) 
Perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping 
I think that tipping is fair 
I think that tipping is acceptable 
I think that tipping is reasonable 
Kimes (1994); 
Taylor & Kimes 
(2010); Wirtz & 
Kimes (2007) 
Empathy I tip to reward good service 
I tip to help servers make a living 
I tip in order to feel satisfaction from doing what 
is right 
I tip in order to express my generosity 
I tip in order to support the custom of tipping 
 
Lynn (2009) 
Restaurant work 
experience 
I have restaurant work experience 
I have server work experience 
Fisher (2015) 
 Manipulation Checks  
Minimum server wage I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a 
high hourly wage 
 
 
Service quality How would you rate the level of service? 
 
 
Realism How realistic is this restaurant scenario?  
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Pretesting 
 To ensure proper manipulations of the minimum server wage and service quality 
conditions, a pretest was conducted using a separate sample of respondents recruited by 
Qualtrics.  A sample of 80 subjects composed of US residents, aged 18 and over, and who had 
dined in a restaurant at least once in the past month was collected.  The participants were equally 
and randomly assigned to one of four treatments ($2.13 per hour minimum server wage x low 
service quality; $2.13 per hour minimum server wage x high service quality; $16.00 per hour 
minimum server wage x low service quality; $16.00 per hour minimum server wage x high 
service quality).  After completing the online scenario experiment, participants were asked to 
rate their level of agreement with the following statement, “I think that servers at this restaurant 
are paid a high hourly wage” on a 7-point Likert type scale.  Results revealed a significant 
difference between the $2.13 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 2.60, SD = 1.92) and 
the $16.00 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 5.15, SD = 1.70); t(78) = -6.286, p < .001.  
Subjects were then asked to answer the following question, “How would you rate the service 
quality at this restaurant?” on a 7-point Likert type scale.  There was a significant difference 
between the low service quality group (M = 4.03, SD = 2.03) and the high service quality group 
(M = 6.33, SD = 0.89); t(78) = -6.560, p < .001.  These results, taken together, demonstrate that 
both the minimum server wage and service quality manipulations were effective.  
Study Two 
Study Two investigated the effect of the minimum server wage and tipping policy taken 
together on guest perceptions of fairness and value.  Specifically, the minimum server wage, 
tipping policy, perceived fairness of tipping policy, perceived value, and empathy were included 
as variables of interest.  After progressing through the experiment stimuli and responding to 
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tipping behavior questions, participants were presented with a set of end-of-experiment questions 
pertaining to empathy, minimum server wage preferences, tipping policy preferences, 
demographics, restaurant visitation frequency, and restaurant work experience.  These end-of-
experiment questions assisted in identifying boundary conditions, presenting alternative 
explanations for observed effects, and describing the sample. 
Participants 
Similar to Study One, Qualtrics was used to recruit participants and collect data online.  
Participants comprising of 270 US residents, aged 18 and over, and who dined in a restaurant at 
least once in the past month were recruited and randomly distributed equally among the six 
treatment groups.  The sample size of 270, calculated using G*Power software, allowed for the 
detection of medium sized differences at a significance level of .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007).  This study obtained approval from University of Nevada Las Vegas’ 
Institutional Review Board.  The IRB approval is provided in Appendix A and the participant 
informed consent form is provided in Appendix B. 
Design  
Study Two examined the effect of the minimum server wage, tipping policy, and the 
interaction of the minimum server wage and tipping policy on perceived fairness and perceived 
value using a 2 (minimum server wage: $2.13 per hour, $16.00 per hour) x 3 (tipping policy: 
voluntary tipping, automatic service charge, and service inclusive pricing) between-subjects 
factorial experimental design.  Each of the six treatment conditions comprised 45 randomly 
assigned participants.  A pilot study was conducted to facilitate manipulation checks to test for 
measurement accuracy and experimental validity.  The experimental design is displayed in Table 
3.  
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An email with a link to the online survey was sent via Qualtrics to its panels.  Participants 
were first presented with an online consent form and three screening questions inquiring about 
their country of residency, age, and dining experience in the prior month.  Qualified participants 
advanced to the survey and restaurant scenario experiment. 
Table 3 
Study Two Experimental Design 
Minimum Server Wage Tipping Policy 
  Voluntary  
Tip 
Automatic 
Service Charge 
Service 
Inclusive Pricing 
$2.13 per hour 45 45 45 
$16.00 per hour 45 45 45 
 
Procedure, Stimuli, and Instrument 
The complete Study Two questionnaire is provided in Appendix D.  The survey began by 
asking participants questions related to their familiarity with voluntary tipping, automatic service 
charge, and service inclusive pricing using a three item 7-point Likert type scale (Kimes & 
Wirtz, 2016; Taylor & Kimes, 2010).  These questions were intended to prepare participants for 
the restaurant dining scenario by priming their thoughts with respect to tipping.  After the tipping 
policy familiarity questions, the online experiment commenced with a detailed introduction 
explicitly stating that servers in the restaurant scenario earned the minimum server rate ($2.13 
per hour / $16.00 per hour) and the restaurant’s tipping policy (voluntary tipping / automatic 
service charge / service inclusive pricing).  
All participants were asked to imagine visiting a hypothetical full-service restaurant and 
were presented with a restaurant stimulus consisting of a description, an exterior restaurant 
photo, and an interior restaurant photo (Lynn & Wang, 2013).  Participants in the voluntary 
tipping condition were provided with the following description: “Imagine that you are going for 
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dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays 
its servers the minimum server wage, which is $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per hour) in this town.”  
Subjects in the automatic service charge condition were provided with the following description: 
“Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is your first visit to this 
restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum server wage, which is $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) in this town.  The restaurant has an automatic 15% service charge that will be 
added to your bill.  The service charge will be passed to servers as a tip.  Additional tipping is 
not allowed.”  Participants in the service inclusive pricing condition were provided with the 
following description: “Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This 
is your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum server wage, 
which is $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per hour) in this town.  The restaurant has an all-inclusive 
pricing policy.  Menu prices have been increased by 15% so that the restaurant can pay servers a 
tip on top of the minimum server wage.  Additional tipping is not allowed.” 
Following the scenario introduction, all subjects were presented with the following 
information: “You walk into the restaurant.  The hostess sees you walk in and immediately greets 
you.  You tell her that you are dining by yourself.  The hostess seats you at a table and gives you 
the menu.”  In addition to this description, a menu stimulus was provided with the relevant 
tipping policy description included in the footnote of the menu.  
Next, all participants were provided with the following description: “Your server sees 
you sit down and immediately greets you.  After you finish reading the menu, your server returns 
and asks for your order.  You order an iced tea, chicken wings as an appetizer, and the spaghetti 
& meatballs.  The server brings you the iced tea and chicken wings.  After you finish the chicken 
wings, the server brings out the spaghetti & meatballs and takes away the empty chicken wings 
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plate.  The food tastes as you expected.  After you finish your meal, the server returns with your 
bill and takes away all the empty dishes.”  A tipping policy condition specific bill stimulus was 
provided with this description.   
The menu item total for the voluntary tipping and automatic service charge conditions 
was equal to $21.65 and tax was equal to $1.10.  The menu item total of $21.65 in the scenario 
was determined by inflating the 2014 full-service restaurant median check size of $20.00 
(National Restaurant Association & Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016) from the December 2014 
price level to the March 2019 price level, the most current available index, using the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation calculator (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2019).  A sales tax rate of 5.10% was applied to the menu item total to determine sales tax of 
$1.10.  The sales tax rate of 5.10% used in the scenario was determined by averaging the 2019 
sales tax rates in the 50 United States of America and the District of Columbia (Cammenga, 
2019).  The pre-tax subtotal was equal to $24.90 in the service inclusive pricing condition, as 
menu item prices were inflated by 15%.  
After viewing all of the scenario material, perceived fairness of tipping policy and 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage were measured using a three item 7-point Likert 
type scale (Kimes, 1994; Taylor & Kimes, 2010; Wirtz & Kimes, 2007).  Perceived value was 
then assessed using a three item 7-point Likert type scale (Ryu, Han, & Kim, 2008). 
After answering questions directly related to the scenario, participants were presented 
with manipulation check questions designed to measure experimental accuracy and validity.  
Following the manipulation check questions, respondent empathy was measured using a five 
item 7-point Likert type scale (Lynn, 2009).  The survey concluded with a set of end-of-
experiment questions concerning demographics, restaurant work experience, restaurant dining 
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frequency, attitudes towards the minimum server wage, and attitudes towards tipping policy.  
Table 4 displays a list of measures used in this study.  Reliability of multi-item constructs will be 
examined and presented in Chapter Four. 
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Table 4 
Study Two Measures 
Variable Measurement Source 
Tipping policy 
familiarity 
I am familiar with tipping servers (automatic service 
charges) (all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants 
Tipping servers (automatic service charges) (all-
inclusive pricing) in restaurants is usual 
Tipping servers (automatic service charges) (all-
inclusive pricing) in restaurants is typical 
 
Kimes & Wirtz 
(2016); Taylor 
& Kimes 
(2010) 
Perceived fairness of 
tipping policy 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is fair 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is acceptable 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is reasonable 
 
Kimes (1994); 
Taylor & 
Kimes (2010); 
Wirtz & Kimes 
(2007) 
Perceived value This restaurant offered good value for the price 
The overall value of dining at this restaurant was high 
The dining experience was worth the money 
 
Ryu et al. 
(2008) 
Empathy I tip to reward good service 
I tip to help servers make a living 
I tip in order to feel satisfaction from doing what is 
right 
I tip in order to express my generosity 
I tip in order to support the custom of tipping 
 
Lynn (2009) 
Restaurant work 
experience 
I have restaurant work experience 
I have server work experience 
Fisher (2015) 
 Manipulation Checks  
Minimum server 
wage 
I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high 
hourly wage 
 
 
Tipping policy Which of the following best describes this 
restaurant’s tipping policy? 
 
Lynn & Wang 
(2013) 
Realism How realistic is this restaurant scenario?  
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Pretesting 
To ensure proper manipulations of the minimum server wage and tipping policy 
conditions, a pretest was conducted using a separate sample of respondents recruited by 
Qualtrics.  A sample of 60 subjects composed of US residents, aged 18 and over, and who had 
dined in a restaurant at least once in the past month was collected.  The participants were equally 
and randomly assigned to one of six treatments ($2.13 per hour minimum server wage x 
voluntary tipping; $16.00 per hour minimum server wage x voluntary tipping; $2.13 per hour 
minimum server wage x automatic service charge; $16.00 per hour minimum server wage x 
automatic service charge; $2.13 per hour minimum server wage x service inclusive pricing; 
$16.00 per hour minimum server wage x service inclusive pricing).  After completing the online 
scenario experiment, participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with the following 
statement, “I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high hourly wage” on a 7-point Likert 
type scale.  Results revealed a significant difference between the $2.13 per hour minimum server 
wage group (M = 3.13, SD = 2.30) and the $16.00 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 
5.00, SD = 2.02); t(58) = -3.342, p = .001, indicating that the minimum server wage manipulation 
was effective.  Subjects were then asked to answer the following question, “Which of the 
following best describes this restaurant’s tipping policy?” (tipping; automatic service charge; all-
inclusive pricing).  A chi-square test of homogeneity of the three tipping policy groups was 
significant, c2(10) = 47.619, p < .001, indicating that the tipping policy manipulation was 
effective.   
Overview of Analysis 
Factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA), factorial analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), 
conditional indirect effects model testing, t-tests, and descriptive analysis were applied to 
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analyze the data.  ANOVA encompasses a body of statistical analyses for designed experiments 
focused on comparing variances from different sources of variability, between-groups and 
within-groups (Keppel & Wickens, 2004, p. 24).  ANCOVA is a more specialized from of 
analysis as it incorporates a covariate, also known as a concomitant variable.  The inclusion of a 
covariate in variance analysis increases power as the variability associated with the concomitant 
variable is removed from the error term (Keppel & Wickens, 2004, p. 311).  The variability of 
the error term is reduced in ANCOVA as scores are statistically adjusted.  A covariate is 
effective when it is strongly correlated with the dependent variable while not correlated with the 
independent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2011, p. 456; Keppel & 
Wickens, 2004, p. 312).  Conditional indirect effects analysis is an appropriate procedure to 
determine and quantify the conditional nature of the transmission of effect from one variable to 
another (Hayes, 2018a, p. 10).  IBM SPSS 23.0 statistical software package was utilized to 
conduct all analyses. 
 Tipping rate was the dependent variable in all hypothesis tests conducted in Study One.  
To test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, an ANCOVA was conducted to test the effect of the minimum 
server wage, moderated by service quality, on tipping rate while controlling for voluntary tipping 
familiarity.  Minimum server wage and service quality were both dichotomous while the mean 
score of the three familiarity questions was used as a composite for voluntary tipping familiarity.  
Hypothesis 4 was tested by utilizing the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2018a), designed to test 
conditional indirect effects models, for SPSS.  Specifically, PROCESS model 4 was used to test 
for the expected mediation effect in hypothesis 4.  Hypotheses 5, 6, 6a, 8, 9, 9a, 11, 11a, and 12 
were tested in interlinked steps using PROCESS models 4, 14, 7, and 21.  Indices of moderated 
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mediation and moderated moderated mediation were used to identify significant conditional 
indirect effects.  Significant moderation effects were followed-up with simple slope analyses. 
Data collected in Study Two were used to test hypotheses 7 and 10.  An ANOVA was 
conducted to test the effect of tipping policy, moderated by minimum server wage, on perceived 
fairness of tipping policy.  Tipping policy was trichotomous, the minimum server wage was 
dichotomous, and the mean score of the three perceived fairness questions was used as a 
composite for perceived fairness of tipping policy.  Follow-up tests were conducted on 
significant effects using post-hoc one-way analyses of variance with Tukey HSD follow-up.  An 
ANCOVA was performed to test the effect of tipping policy on perceived value while controlling 
for empathy.  Tipping policy was trichotomous, the mean score of the three perceived value 
questions was used as a composite for perceived value, and the mean score of the five empathy 
questions was used as a composite for empathy.  Follow-up tests were conducted on significant 
effects using Tukey HSD post hoc tests. 
Limitations and Potential Errors 
 Limitations associated with most experimental research are applicable to the current 
studies.  The foremost caveat of experimental design is the presentation of a hypothetical 
scenario as a substitute for a real-world scenario followed by asking respondents to evaluate 
stimuli in the absence of a real monetary trade off (Fong, Law, Tang, & Yap, 2016).  In the 
present research, the results of participant attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions may be biased.  
The results of the current studies may be restricted to the current experimental conditions 
limiting the generalizability of findings.   
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Summary 
 This chapter discussed the overall methodology of the two studies comprising this 
dissertation.  The research designs, participants, stimuli, procedures, instruments, and pretesting 
analysis were described in this chapter.  Results arising from the application of these methods are 
presented in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the two studies conducted following the research 
methods discussed in the previous chapter.  Based on the data analysis plan presented in Chapter 
Three, findings are presented in the order of the studies conducted. 
Study One 
 Focused on voluntary tipping, Study One investigated the role of the minimum server 
wage and service quality in relationships with tipping rate, perceived fairness of the minimum 
server wage, perceived fairness of voluntary tipping, empathy, and voluntary tipping familiarity.  
The following sections are organized as follows: respondent demographics; validity and 
reliability; the interaction of the minimum server wage and service quality on tipping rate; 
conditional indirect effects of the minimum server wage on tipping rate; and conditional indirect 
effects of service quality on tipping rate.  
Respondent Demographics 
A total of 630 online subjects were recruited for Study One.  Gender was equally 
represented and age was distributed as follows: 13.0% between 18 and 24, 20.6% between 25 
and 34, 19.7% between 35 and 44, 20.3% between 45 and 54, 15.9% between 55 and 64, and 
10.5% were over 64.  Nearly one third of the respondents (63.5%) held a college degree and 
approximately half (49.2%) of the subjects were employed full-time.  Within the sample, 41.0% 
of the respondents reported annual household income of less than $50,000 while the remaining 
59.0% reported household income of $50,000 or more.  The average restaurant dining frequency 
was 5.7 times per month, with a lowest frequency of less than once a month and a highest 
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frequency of daily.  A notable portion of the respondents had restaurant work experience, with 
29.4% in server positions and 13.0% in non-server positions.  The detailed demographic profile 
of the respondents is presented in Table 5.   
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Table 5  
Study One Respondent Demographics 
  Frequency % 
Gender Male 315 50.0 
 Female 315 50.0 
    
Age 18 – 24 82 13.0 
 25 – 34 130 20.6 
 35 – 44 124 19.7 
 45 – 54 128 20.3 
 55 – 64 100 15.9 
 65 and over 66 10.5 
    
Education Some high school 16 2.5 
 High school 206 32.7 
 Associate degree 117 18.6 
 Bachelor degree 188 29.8 
 Graduate degree 95 15.1 
 Prefer not to answer 8 1.3 
    
Employment Full-time 310 49.2 
 Part-time 67 10.6 
 Retired 97 15.4 
 Unemployed 89 14.1 
 Student 25 34.0 
 Self employed 36 5.7 
 Prefer not to answer 6 1.0 
    
Household income Under $25,000 114 18.1 
 $25,000 - $49,999 144 22.9 
 $50,000 - $74,999 120 19.1 
 $75,000 - $99,999 76 12.1 
 $100,000 and over 
 
176 27.9 
Monthly restaurant  Less than once a month 3 0.5 
dining frequency 1 – 2 139 22.1 
 3 – 5 273 43.3 
 6 – 10 153 24.3 
 11 – 15 31 4.9 
 More than 15 31 4.9 
    
Work experience No restaurant work experience 363 57.6 
 Non-server restaurant experience 82 13.0 
 Server work experience 185 29.4 
Note. N = 630. 
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Validity and Reliability 
 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four different treatment groups in a 2 x 2 
between-subjects experimental design.  Consequently, potential internal validity concerns of 
sample maturity, mortality, learning effects, and historical effects were minimized.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha of variables that utilized multi-item measurements all exceeded .700, 
indicating that all variables possessed internal consistency and reliability (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2011) and are presented in Table 6.  
Table 6 
Study One Internal Reliability of Multi-item Measured Variables 
Variable Measurement Cronbach’s a 
Voluntary tipping 
familiarity  
I am familiar with tipping servers in restaurants 
Tipping servers in restaurants is usual 
Tipping servers in restaurants is typical 
 
.883 
Perceived fairness of 
the minimum server 
wage 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is fair 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is acceptable 
The think that the $2.13 per hour ($16.00 per 
hour) minimum server wage is reasonable 
 
.973 
Perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping 
I think that tipping is fair 
I think that tipping is acceptable 
I think that tipping is reasonable 
 
.956 
Empathy I tip to reward good service 
I tip to help servers make a living 
I tip in order to feel satisfaction from doing what 
is right 
I tip in order to express my generosity 
I tip in order to support the custom of tipping 
.733 
 
To assess external and ecological validity, manipulation checks were conducted after 
respondents answered survey questions pertaining to their assigned treatment group.  The 
minimum server wage manipulation was assessed by asking subjects how strongly they agreed 
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with the following statement, “I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high hourly wage” 
on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  There was a significant 
difference between the $2.13 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 2.53, SD = 1.73) and 
the $16.00 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 5.18, SD = 1.58); t(628) =  
-20.071, p < .001.  The service quality manipulation was evaluated by asking respondents to rate 
the level of service quality provided in the restaurant scenario on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = 
low; 7 = high).  There was a significant difference between the low service quality group (M = 
3.39, SD = 1.58) and the high service quality group (M = 6.18, SD = 1.03); t(628) = -26.126, p < 
.001.  The results of these t-tests indicate that both the minimum server wage and service quality 
manipulations were effective.  In addition to the manipulation check questions, respondents were 
asked to rate the level of realism of the scenario depicting a restaurant dining experience on a 7-
point Likert type scale (1 = completely unrealistic; 7 = completely realistic).  The mean rating 
was 5.21 (SD = 1.63) suggesting that the subjects perceived the scenario as realistic.  
The Interaction of the Minimum Server Wage and Service Quality on Tipping Rate 
The data were submitted to a 2 x 2 two factor analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the 
minimum server wage ($2.13 per hour and $16.00 per hour) as one independent variable, service 
quality (low and high) as the second independent variable, and tipping rate as the dependent 
measure.  Voluntary tipping familiarity was found to significantly correlate with tipping rate 
(Pearson’s r = .219, p < .001) and not significantly correlate with the minimum server wage or 
service quality.  Subsequently, voluntary tipping familiarity was the covariate.  The statistical 
test for the covariate was significant, F(1, 625) = 36.290 (MSE = 2,308.802, h2 = .006), p < .001.  
The statistical test for the minimum server wage main effect was also significant, F(1, 625) = 
5.192 (MSE = 330.293, h2 = .008), p = .023, indicating that tipping rate is higher when the 
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minimum server wage is $2.13 per hour (M = 13.73) and lower when the minimum server wage 
is $16.00 per hour (M = 12.28).  Consequently, hypothesis 1 is supported.  The statistical test for 
the service quality main effect was significant, F(1, 625) = 119.675 (MSE = 7,613.772, h2 = 
.161), p < .001, indicating that tipping rate is higher when service quality is high (M = 16.48) and 
lower when service quality is low (M = 9.53).  Thus, hypothesis 2 is supported.  The statistical 
test for the minimum server wage x service quality interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 
625) = 0.272 (MSE = 17.292, h2 = .000), p = .602.  Accordingly, hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
The mean tipping rate, as a percentage of bill total, and significance tests are displayed in Table 
7.  
Table 7 
Tipping Rate ANCOVA Results 
Dependent Variable Independent variables F(1,625) h2 
 Minimum server wage   
 $2.13 per hour $16.00 per hour   
Tipping rate 13.73 12.28 5.192* .008 
 Service quality   
 Low High   
Tipping rate 9.53 16.48 119.657*** .023 
Note.  *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
Conditional Indirect Effects of the Minimum Server Wage on Tipping Rate 
 Hypothesis 4 suggests an indirect effects model, also known as a simple mediation 
model, where the minimum server wage transmits its effect on tipping rate through perceived 
fairness of the minimum server wage as an intermediary variable.  The casual steps approach 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986), requiring the identification of a significant direct effect from the 
independent variable to the dependent variable in step one before continuing to subsequent steps 
in the process, was a previously popular method of testing for mediation (Perera, 2013).  
However, methodologists have since questioned the prerequisite of a significant direct effect 
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prior to testing for an indirect effect, as significant mediation can exist notwithstanding a non-
significant direct effect (Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala, & Petty, 2001).  As a result, 
many contemporary approaches have turned to formal significance tests, such as the Sobel 
(1982) test, of indirect effects focused on product of coefficients and bootstrapping to find 
support for mediation (Hayes, 2018a; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Perera, 2013; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).  Accordingly, hypothesis 4 was tested in 
a simple mediation model using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2018a) with the 
minimum server wage as the independent variable, perceived fairness of the minimum server 
wage as the mediator, and tipping rate as the dependent variable in PROCESS model 4.  To 
mitigate against non-essential multicollinearity, all continuous variables were centered on their 
means (Aiken & West, 1991; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005). 
 Bootstrap tests of mediated effect revealed that the indirect effect of the minimum server 
wage on tipping rate via perceived fairness of the minimum server wage was not statistically 
significant (indirect effect = 0.796, SE = 0.633, 95% CI = -0.445, 2.055).  Consequently, 
hypothesis 4 is not supported.  The results of the mediation model are presented in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Mediation of Tipping Rate Regressed on the Minimum Server Wage OLS Regression Results 
 B SE t R2 
Perceived fairness of the minimum server wage 
Constant 2.516 0.095 26.605*** .383*** 
Minimum server wage 2.635 0.134 19.736***  
Tipping rate 
Constant 12.879 0.733 17.573*** .008 
Minimum server wage -2.060 0.903 -2.281*  
Perceived fairness of minimum server wage 0.302 0.212 1.425  
Note. N = 630. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
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Conditional Indirect Effects of Service Quality on Tipping Rate 
Hypothesis testing of the conditional indirect effects of service quality on tipping rate 
was conducted in a series of four interlinked steps.  First, a mediation model was tested, next a 
second stage moderated mediation model was examined, then a first stage moderated mediation 
model was analyzed, and finally a moderated moderated mediation model was tested.  To 
mitigate against non-essential multicollinearity, all continuous variables were centered on their 
means (Aiken & West, 1991; Muller et al., 2005).   
Step 1: Mediation model testing. 
Hypotheses 5 and 8 were tested using a parallel mediation model with service quality as 
the independent variable and tipping rate as the dependent variable.  The PROCESS macro for 
SPSS (Hayes, 2018a) was used with fairness of voluntary tipping and empathy assigned as 
parallel mediators in PROCESS model 4.  The parallel mediator model is shown in Figure 8.  In 
line with predictions, bootstrap tests of mediated effect revealed that the indirect effect of service 
quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping was statistically significant 
(indirect effect = 0.371, SE = 0.143, 95% CI = 0.113, 0.674) and in the expected directions.  
Thus, hypothesis 5 is supported.  Bootstrap tests of mediated effect revealed that the indirect 
effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy was not statistically significant (indirect 
effect = 0.131, SE = 0.092, 95% CI = -0.016, 0.343).  Consequently, hypothesis 8 is not 
supported.  The results of the parallel mediation model are presented in Table 9. 
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Figure 8. Parallel mediation of tipping rate regressed on service quality. 
 
Table 9 
Mediation of Tipping Rate Regressed on Service Quality OLS Regression Results 
 B SE t R2 
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
Constant 5.918 0.062 95.201*** .014* 
Service quality 0.259 0.088 2.949*  
Empathy 
Constant 5.359 0.057 93.647*** .011* 
Service quality 0.214 0.081 2.644  
Tipping Rate 
Constant -2.257 2.023 -1.116 .203*** 
Service quality 6.528 0.642 10.169***  
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 1.430 0.329 4.345***  
Empathy 0.613 0.357 1.715  
Note. N = 630. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
As the mediation of empathy on the effect of service quality on tipping rate was not 
significant, the second stage moderation of the minimum server wage on the mediation of 
empathy on the effect of service quality on tipping rate was not tested.  Thus, hypotheses 9 and 
9a are not supported.  
Step 2: Second stage moderated mediation model testing. 
As perceived fairness of voluntary tipping was found to significantly mediate the effect 
of service quality on tipping rate, the strength of the indirect effect conditional on the minimum 
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server wage was subsequently tested in a second stage moderated mediation model.  Hypotheses 
6 and 6a were tested using PROCESS model 14 with service quality as the independent variable, 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping as the mediator, the minimum server wage as the 
moderator, and tipping rate as the dependent variable.  The cross-product term between 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and the minimum server wage was significant (B = 1.370, 
SE = 0.573, t = 2.392, p = 0.017).  Evidence of moderated mediation was ascertained by a 
significant index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015) (index of moderated mediation = 0.355, 
SE = 0.190, 95% CI = 0.051, 0.798).  When the bootstrap confidence interval of the index of 
moderated mediation does not contain zero, a formal test has quantified the relationship between 
an indirect effect and a moderator, and infers (1) a non-zero relationship between an indirect 
effect and moderator and (2) “implies that any two conditional indirect effects defined by 
different values of the moderator are statistically different” (Hayes, 2015, p. 14).  Consequently, 
hypothesis 6 is supported.   
To test hypothesis 6a, simple slopes were plotted for the two minimum server wage 
conditions and are presented in Figure 9.  In line with expectations, the slope of the relationship 
between perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and tipping rate was relatively weaker for the 
$2.13 per hour minimum server wage condition (simple slope = 1.662, t = 5.763, p < .001) and 
relatively stronger for the $16.00 per hour minimum server wage condition (simple slope = 
3.032, t = 4.764, p < .001).  This result indicates that the indirect effect of service quality on 
tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping is stronger when the minimum server 
wage is higher.  Accordingly, hypothesis 6a is supported.  The results of the second stage 
moderated mediation model are presented in Table 10. 
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Table 10 
Second Stage Moderated Mediation of Tipping Rate Regressed on Service Quality OLS 
Regression Results 
               B SE t R2 
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
Constant -0.130 0.062 -2.085* .014* 
Service quality 0.259 0.088 2.949*  
Tipping rate 
Constant 9.727 0.450 21.612*** .210*** 
Service quality 6.633 0.639 10.385***  
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 1.662 0.288 5.763***  
Minimum server wage -1.076 0.635 -1.694  
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
x Minimum server wage 
1.370 0.573 2.392*  
 5,000 bootstrap samples 
Minimum server wage Conditional indirect effect SE 95% LCI 95% UCI 
$2.13 per hour 0.431 0.148 0.147 0.734 
$16.00 per hour 0.786 0.289 0.263 13.398 
Note. N = 630. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 9. Tipping rate predicted by perceived fairness of voluntary tipping moderated by the 
minimum server wage. 
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Step 3: First stage moderated mediation model testing 
As perceived fairness of voluntary tipping was found to significantly mediate the effect 
of service quality on tipping rate, the first stage moderation of voluntary tipping familiarity on 
the mediation of perceived fairness of voluntary tipping on the effect of service quality on 
tipping rate was tested.  Hypotheses 11 and 11a were tested using PROCESS model 7 with 
service quality as the independent variable, voluntary tipping familiarity as the moderator, 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping as the mediator, and tipping rate as the dependent 
variable.  The cross-product term between service quality and voluntary tipping familiarity was 
significant (B = 0.290, SE = 0.072, t = 4.036, p < 0.001).  Evidence of moderated mediation was 
ascertained by a significant index of moderated mediation (Hayes, 2015) (index of moderated 
mediation = 0.493, SE = 0.244, 95% CI = 0.026, 0.971).  When the bootstrap confidence interval 
of the index of moderated mediation does not contain zero, a formal test has quantified the 
relationship between an indirect effect and a moderator, and infers (1) a non-zero relationship 
between an indirect effect and moderator and (2) “implies that any two conditional indirect 
effects defined by different values of the moderator are statistically different” (Hayes, 2015, p. 
14).  Consequently, hypothesis 11 is supported.   
To test hypothesis 11a, conventional procedures for plotting simple slopes at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean of voluntary tipping familiarity were applied.  The 
results of the simple slopes analysis are presented in Figure 10.  Consistent with expectations, the 
slope of the relationship between voluntary tipping familiarity and perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping was relatively weaker when service quality is low (simple slope = 0.047, t = 
0.511, p = .610) and relatively stronger when service quality is high (simple slope = 0.432, t = 
4.764, p < .001).  As shown in Table 11, the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate 
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through perceived fairness of voluntary tipping is significant when voluntary tipping familiarity 
is moderate (i.e., mean value) and high (i.e., one standard deviation above the mean).  
Accordingly, hypothesis 11a is supported.  The results of the first stage moderated mediation 
model are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
First Stage Moderated Mediation of Tipping Rate Regressed on Service Quality OLS Regression 
Results 
                 B      SE t R2 
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
Constant 6.044 0.039 155.790*** .234*** 
Service quality 0.239 0.078 3.081*  
Voluntary tipping familiarity 0.476 0.036 13.259***  
Service quality x Voluntary tipping 
familiarity 
0.290 0.072 4.036***  
Tipping rate 
Constant 2.725   1.779 1.532 .199*** 
Service quality 6.589 0.642 10.265***  
Perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping 
1.700 0.289 5.874***  
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 5,000 bootstrap samples 
Voluntary tipping familiarity Conditional indirect effect SE 95% LCI 95% UCI 
Conditional indirect effect at voluntary tipping familiarity = M ± 1 SD 
-1 SD (-1.0932) -0.078 0.111 -0.030 0.139 
M (0.00) 0.239 0.078 0.087 0.392 
+1 SD (0.6656) 0.432 0.091 0.253 0.611 
Conditional indirect effect at range of values of voluntary tipping familiarity 
-5.334 -1.307 0.391 -2.074 -0.539 
-5.034 -1.220 0.370 -1.950 -0.493 
-4.734 -1.133 0.349 -1.818 -0.448 
-4.434 -1.046 0.328 -1.690 -0.402 
-4.134 -0.959 0.307 -1.562 -0.360 
-3.834 -0.872 0.286 -1.434 -0.310 
-3.534 -0.785 0.266 -1.307 -0.264 
-3.234 -0.698 0.245 -1.180 -0.217 
-2.934 -0.611 0.225 -1.052 -0.170 
-2.634 -0.524 0.205 -0.926 -0.122 
-2.334 -0.437 0.185 -0.800 -0.074 
-2.034 -0.350 0.166 -0.676 -0.025 
-1.883 -0.306 0.156 -0.613 0.000 
-1.734 -0.264 0.147 -0.552 0.025 
-1.434 -0.177 0.129 -0.430 0.077 
-1.134 -0.090 0.113 -0.311 0.132 
-0.834 -0.003 0.098 -0.196 0.190 
-0.534 0.084 0.087 -0.086 0.254 
-0.281 0.158 0.080 0.000 0.315 
-0.234 0.171 0.079 0.015 0.327 
0.066 0.258 0.078 0.106 0.411 
0.366 0.345 0.082 0.184 0.506 
0.666 0.432 0.091 0.253 0.611 
Note. N = 630. *p < .05. ***p < .001.  
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Figure 10. Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping predicted by voluntary tipping familiarity 
moderated by service quality. 
 
Step 4: Moderated moderated mediation model testing 
 As the second stage moderated mediation and first stage moderated mediation models in 
steps 2 and 3 respectively were both statistically significant, voluntary tipping familiarity and the 
minimum server wage as moderators were subsequently tested together in a moderated 
moderated mediation model.  Hypothesis 12 was tested using PROCESS model 21 with service 
quality as the independent variable, voluntary tipping familiarity as the first stage moderator, 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping as the mediator, the minimum server wage as the second 
stage moderator, and tipping rate as the dependent variable.  Evidence of moderated moderated 
mediation was ascertained by a significant index of moderated moderated mediation (Hayes, 
2018b) (index of moderated moderated mediation = 0.397, SE = 0.261, 95% CI = 0.000, 0.993).  
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When the bootstrap confidence interval of the index of moderated moderated mediation does not 
contain zero, a formal test has confirmed that “the moderation of the indirect effect by one 
moderator is itself moderated by the other moderator” (Hayes, 2018b, p. 26).  The positive and 
significant index of moderated moderated mediation indicates that the moderation of voluntary 
tipping familiarity of the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate increases when the 
minimum server wage increases from $2.13 per hour to $16.00 per hour.  As shown in Table 12, 
the moderation of voluntary tipping familiarity on the moderation of the minimum server wage 
on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate through perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping is significant when voluntary tipping familiarity is moderate (i.e., mean value) and high 
(i.e., maximum value).  Consequently, hypothesis 12 is supported.  
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Table 12 
Moderated Moderated Mediation of Tipping Rate Regressed on Service Quality OLS Regression 
Results 
  B SE t R2 
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping 
Constant  -0.123 0.055 -2.235* .234*** 
Service quality  0.239 0.078 3.081*  
Voluntary tipping familiarity  0.331 0.047 7.054***  
Service quality x Voluntary tipping familiarity  0.290 0.072 4.036***  
Tipping rate 
Constant  9.727 0.450 21.612*** .210*** 
Service quality  6.633 0.634 10.385***  
Voluntary tipping familiarity  1.662 0.289 5.763***  
Minimum server wage  -1.076 0.635 -1.694  
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping x  
    Minimum server wage 
1.370 0.573 2.392*  
Conditional indirect effects at various moderator values 
 5,000 bootstrap samples 
Voluntary tipping 
familiarity Minimum server wage 
Indirect 
effect 
estimate SE 95% LCI 95% UCI 
5.24 (M – 1 SD) $2.13 per hour -0.129 0.315 -0.742 0.482 
5.24 (M – 1 SD) $16.00 per hour -0.236 0.584 -1.391 0.892 
6.33 (M) $2.13 per hour 0.397 0.135 0.148 0.671 
6.33 (M) $16.00 per hour 0.725 0.262 0.260 1.304 
7 (max) $2.13 per hour 0.718 0.194 0.356 1.119 
7 (max) $16.00 per hour 1.310 0.385 0.631 2.130 
  5,000 bootstrap samples 
  Index SE 95% LCI 95% UCI 
Moderated moderated mediation 0.397 0.261 0.000 0.993 
Conditional moderated mediation     
By voluntary tipping familiarity between:     
 Minimum server wage = $2.13 per hour 0.482 0.242 0.025 0.962 
 Minimum server wage = $16.00 per hour 0.879 0.458 0.048 1.839 
By minimum server wage among:     
 Voluntary tipping familiarity = 5.24 (M – 1 SD) -0.106 0.285 -0.735 0.452 
 Voluntary tipping familiarity = 6.33 (M) 0.328 0.172 0.051 0.731 
 Voluntary tipping familiarity = 7 (max) 0.592 0.592 0.109 1.205 
Note. N = 630. *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
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Study Two 
Study Two investigated the role of the minimum server wage in combination with 
different tipping policies on perceived fairness of tipping policy and perceived value.  The 
following sections are organized as follows: respondent demographics; validity and reliability; 
perceived fairness of tipping policy; and perceived value. 
Respondent Demographics 
 A total of 270 participants with equal gender representation were recruited for Study 
Two.  Respondent age was distributed as follows: 12.6% between 18 and 24, 18.2% between 25 
and 34, 17.0% between 35 and 44, 18.2% between 45 and 54, 15.6% between 55 and 64, and 
18.5% were over 64.  Nearly half of the subjects were employed full-time (48.9%) and 63.3% 
held a college degree.  Within the sample, 40.0% of the respondents reported annual household 
income of under $50,000, while the remaining 60.0% report household income of $50,000 or 
more.  Nearly a quarter (23.7%) of the respondents had server work experience, while 15.6% had 
restaurant work experience in non-server positions.  The detailed demographic profile of the 
respondents is presented in Table 13.   
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Table 13 
Study Two Respondent Demographics 
  Frequency % 
Gender Male 135 50.0 
 Female 135 50.0 
    
Age 18 – 24 34 12.6 
 25 – 34 49 18.2 
 35 – 44 46 17.0 
 45 – 54 49 18.2 
 55 – 64 42 15.6 
 65 and over 50 18.5 
    
Education Some high school 7 2.6 
 High school 88 32.6 
 Associate degree 33 12.2 
 Bachelor degree 84 31.1 
 Graduate degree 54 20.0 
 Prefer not to answer 4 1.5 
    
Employment Full-time 132 48.9 
 Part-time 29 10.7 
 Retired 48 17.8 
 Unemployed 27 10.0 
 Student 17 6.3 
 Self employed 13 4.8 
 Prefer not to answer 4 1.5 
    
Household income Under $25,000 47 17.4 
 $25,000 - $49,999 61 22.6 
 $50,000 - $74,999 51 18.9 
 $75,000 - $99,999 37 13.7 
 $100,000 and over 
 
74 27.4 
Monthly restaurant  Less than once a month 3 1.1 
dining frequency 1 – 2 69 25.6 
 3 – 5 115 42.6 
 6 – 10 64 23.7 
 11 – 15 6 2.2 
 More than 15 13 4.8 
    
Work experience No restaurant work experience 164 60.7 
 Non-server restaurant experience 42 15.6 
 Server work experience 64 23.7 
Note. N = 270. 
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Validity and Reliability 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six different treatment groups in a 2 x 3 
between-subjects experimental design.  Accordingly, potential impairments to internal validity 
such as sample maturity, mortality, learning effects, and historical effects were mitigated against.  
The Cronbach’s alpha of variables that utilized multi-item measurements all exceeded .700, 
indicating that all variables possessed internal consistency and reliability (Hair et al., 2011) and 
are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Study Two Internal Reliability of Multi-item Measured Variables 
Variable Measurement Cronbach’s a 
Tipping policy 
familiarity 
I am familiar with tipping servers (automatic 
service charges) (all-inclusive pricing) in 
restaurants 
Tipping servers (automatic service charges) (all-
inclusive pricing) in restaurants is usual 
Tipping servers (automatic service charges) (all-
inclusive pricing) in restaurants is typical 
 
.916 
Perceived fairness of 
tipping policy 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is fair 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is 
acceptable 
I think tipping servers (automatic service charges) 
(all-inclusive pricing) in restaurants is 
reasonable 
 
.964 
Perceived value This restaurant offered good value for the price 
The overall value of dining at this restaurant was 
high 
The dining experience was worth the money 
 
.712 
Empathy I tip to reward good service 
I tip to help servers make a living 
I tip in order to feel satisfaction from doing what 
is right 
I tip in order to express my generosity 
I tip in order to support the custom of tipping 
.744 
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To assess external and ecological validity, manipulation checks were conducted after 
respondents answered survey questions pertaining to their assigned treatment group.  The 
minimum server wage manipulation was assessed by asking subjects how strongly they agreed 
with the following statement, “I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high hourly wage” 
on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  There was a significant 
difference between the $2.13 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 2.62, SD = 1.76) and 
the $16.00 per hour minimum server wage group (M = 4.97, SD = 1.71), t(268) =  
-11.127, p < .001, indicating that the minimum wage manipulation was successful.  The tipping 
policy manipulation was evaluated by asking respondents, “Which of the following best 
describes this restaurant’s tipping policy?” (tipping; automatic service charge; all-inclusive 
pricing).  A chi-square test of homogeneity of the three tipping policy groups was significant, 
c2(10) = 182.062, p < .001, indicating that the tipping policy manipulation was effective at 
producing the intended tipping policy differences.  In addition to the manipulation check 
questions, respondents were asked to rate the level of realism of the scenario depicting a 
restaurant dining experience on a 7-point Likert type scale (1 = completely unrealistic; 7 = 
completely realistic).  The mean rating was 4.70 (SD = 1.78) suggesting that the subjects 
perceived the scenario as realistic. 
Perceived Fairness of Tipping Policy 
The data were submitted to a 2 x 3 two factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the 
minimum server wage ($2.13 per hour and $16.00 per hour) as one independent variable, tipping 
policy (voluntary tipping, automatic service charge, and service inclusive pricing) as the second 
independent variable, and perceived fairness of tipping policy as the dependent measure.  The 
statistical test for the minimum server wage main effect was not significant, F(1, 264) = 0.426 
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(MSE = 1.155, h2 = .002), p = .514.  The statistical test for the tipping policy main effect was 
significant, F(2, 264) = 21.588 (MSE = 721.588, h2 = .141), p < .001.  Post-hoc one-way 
analyses of variance with Tukey HSD follow-up revealed that voluntary tipping had the highest 
level of perceived fairness overall.  The statistical test for the minimum server wage x tipping 
policy interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 264) = 0.276 (MSE = 0.749, h2 = .002), p = 
.759.  Consequently, hypothesis 7 is not supported.  The mean perceived fairness of tipping 
policy, calculated on a 7-point Likert type scale, and significance tests are displayed in Table 15. 
Table 15 
Perceived Fairness of Tipping Policy ANOVA Results 
Dependent Variable Independent variables F(1,264) h2 
 Minimum server wage   
  $2.13/hour $16.00/hour   
Perceived fairness 
of tipping policy  5.07 5.20 0.426 .002 
Dependent Variable Independent variables F(2,264) h2  
 Tipping Policy   
 Voluntary 
tipping 
Automatic 
service 
charge 
Service 
inclusive 
pricing 
  
Perceived fairness 
of tipping policy 6.06 4.54 4.83 21.588*** .141 
Note. ***p < .001. 
Perceived Value 
The data were submitted to a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with tipping 
policy (voluntary tipping, automatic service charge, and service inclusive pricing) as the 
independent variable and perceived value as the dependent measure.  Empathy was found to 
significantly correlate with perceived value (Pearson’s r = .341, p < .001) and not significantly 
correlate with tipping policy.  Subsequently, empathy was the covariate.  The statistical test for 
the covariate was significant, F(1,266) = 36.416 (MSE = 51.833, h2 = .120), p < .001.  The 
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statistical test for tipping policy was also significant, F(2,266) = 5.397 (MSE = 7.682, h2 = .039), 
p = .005.  A Tukey HSD follow-up procedure revealed that voluntary tipping had the highest 
perceived value overall.  Consequently, hypothesis 10 is partially supported.  The mean 
perceived value, calculated on a 7-point Likert type scale, and significance tests are displayed in 
Table 16. 
Table 16 
Perceived Value ANCOVA Results 
Dependent Variable Independent variables F(2,266) h2  
 Tipping Policy   
 Voluntary 
tipping 
Automatic 
service 
charge 
Service 
inclusive 
pricing 
  
Perceived value 5.15 4.56 4.81 5.397*** .039 
Note. ***p < .001. 
Summary 
 The results of the two studies conducted for this dissertation were presented in this 
chapter providing support for select hypotheses.  Discussion of the findings, implications, and 
concluding thoughts are presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents the major findings and the implications of this two study 
dissertation.  Using equity theory as a theoretical foundation, and in combination with 
established tipping antecedents, this dissertation examined the role and influence of the 
minimum server wage in the restaurant tipping phenomenon.  A discussion of the findings of 
each study are presented, followed by theoretical implications and practical implications.  Lastly, 
this chapter concludes with limitations and recommendations for future research.   
Discussion of Findings 
 Grounded in equity theory, this dissertation investigated the influence of the minimum 
server wage, in combination with established antecedents, on restaurant guest tipping behavior, 
perceptions of fairness, and perceptions of value.  The variables of interest were isolated and 
tested by conducting two separate between-subjects online scenario experiments.  Study One 
focused on voluntary tipping to examine the effect of the minimum server wage on tipping rate 
while considering service quality, perceptions of fairness, and familiarity.  Study Two explored 
the influence of the minimum server wage in different tipping policies.  Analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA), conditional indirect effects analysis, and analysis of variance (ANOVA) were 
conducted to test the hypotheses.   
Study One 
 The hypothesis testing results for Study One are displayed in Table 17. 
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Table 17 
Study One Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Supported 
H1 Tipping rate is higher when the minimum server wage is low versus when 
the minimum server wage is high. 
 
Yes 
H2 Tipping rate is higher when service quality is high versus when service 
quality is low. 
 
Yes 
H3 The effect of service quality on tipping rate differs for different minimum 
server wage conditions.  Specifically, when the minimum server wage is 
low, service quality will not affect tipping rate.  When the minimum server 
wage is high, tipping rate is higher when service quality is high versus 
when service quality is low.  
 
No 
H4 The negative effect of the minimum server wage on tipping rate is mediated 
by perceived fairness of the minimum server wage.  Specifically, the 
minimum server wage has a positive effect on perceived fairness of the 
minimum server wage and perceived fairness of the minimum server wage 
has a negative effect on tipping rate. 
 
No 
H5 The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  Specifically, service quality has a 
positive effect on perceived fairness of voluntary tipping and perceived 
fairness of voluntary tipping has a positive effect on tipping rate. 
 
Yes 
H6 The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the 
indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping. 
 
Yes 
H6a The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness 
of voluntary tipping will be stronger when the minimum server wage is 
higher versus when the minimum server wage is lower.  
 
Yes 
H8 The positive effect of service quality on tipping rate is mediated by 
empathy.  Specifically, service quality has a positive effect on empathy and 
empathy has a positive effect on tipping rate. 
 
No 
H9 The minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the 
indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy. 
 
No 
H9a The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via empathy will be 
stronger when the minimum server wage is lower versus when the 
minimum server wage is higher. 
 
No 
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Hypothesis Supported 
H11 Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation of the 
indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping. 
 
Yes 
H11a The indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness 
of voluntary tipping will be stronger when voluntary tipping familiarity is 
higher versus when voluntary tipping familiarity is lower. 
 
Yes 
H12 Voluntary tipping familiarity moderates the first stage mediation and the 
minimum server wage moderates the second stage mediation of the indirect 
effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping. 
Yes 
 
The first statistical procedure conducted on the data collected in Study One, a two factor 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), revealed that tipping rate varies for different levels of the 
minimum server wage, resulting in support for hypothesis 1.  Specifically, the mean tipping rate 
is higher when the minimum server wage is $2.13 per hour (M = 13.73) versus when the 
minimum server wage is $16.00 per hour (M = 12.28).  There was also a significant difference in 
perceived fairness of the minimum server wage, t(628) = -19.736, p < .001, with subjects in the 
$16.00 per hour group reporting higher perceptions of fairness (M = 5.15, SD = 1.62) compared 
to the $2.13 per hour group (M = 2.52, SD = 1.73).  The significant main effect of the minimum 
server wage on tipping rate and significant difference in perceived fairness of the minimum 
server wage taken together, along with the application of equity theory, may suggest that guests 
utilize voluntary tipping as a mechanism to equalize a less fair minimum server wage.  This 
conjuncture was tested in a simple mediation model with the minimum server wage as the 
independent variable, perceived fairness of the minimum server wage as the mediator, and 
tipping rate as the dependent variable.  The mediating effect of perceived fairness of the 
minimum server wage was not significant and as a result, hypothesis 4 was not supported.  
Closer inspection of the simple mediation model revealed that the second stage mediation path 
 102 
was not significant (B = 0.302, SE = 0.212, p = .155).  This finding infers that the inverse 
relationship between the minimum server wage and tipping rate is not attributed to the 
equalization of lower levels of perceived fairness of the minimum server wage as a mediator and 
possibly suggests the presence of an unidentified intermediary variable.  
The ANCOVA results revealed that tipping rate varies for different levels of service 
quality, providing support for hypothesis 2.  However, the interaction effect of the minimum 
server wage and service quality on tipping rate was not significant and consequently, hypothesis 
3 was not supported.  A possible explanation for these results is that although guests tip more 
when the minimum server wage is low, they still expect servers to deliver a minimal level of 
service quality.  The lack of support for hypothesis 3 does not necessarily negate the applicability 
of the equity theory input to output equation in explicating the influence of the minimum server 
wage on tipping rate.  However, further research is required to investigate the proportionate 
weighting of the minimum server wage and tipping rate as inputs in relation to service quality as 
an output. 
The series of interlinked tests of conditional indirect effects of service quality on tipping 
rate concluded with evidence of significant moderated moderated mediation.  Although the first 
test determined that empathy was not a significant mediator, perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping was found to mediate the effect of service quality on tipping rate.  All of the coefficients 
in the simple mediation model of the effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived 
fairness of voluntary tipping were positive and significant, resulting in support for hypothesis 5.  
The positive coefficients suggest that guests equate higher service quality with higher output and 
view voluntary tipping as a fair mechanism for increasing inputs to commensurate levels of 
output.   
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The next test of conditional indirect effects found a significant interaction between the 
minimum server wage and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping on tipping rate, providing 
support for hypothesis 6.  As the slope of the linear relationship between perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping and tipping rate was relatively weaker for a minimum server wage equal to 
$2.13 per hour compared to a minimum server wage equal to $16.00 per hour, there is evidence 
that the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping is stronger when the minimum server wage is higher.  Consequently, hypothesis 6a was 
supported.  Interestingly however, at lower levels of perceived fairness of voluntary tipping (i.e., 
at the mean and one standard deviation below the mean), tipping rate is higher when the 
minimum server wage is equal to $2.13 per hour versus when the minimum server wage is equal 
to $16.00 per hour.  Conversely, at higher levels of perceived fairness of voluntary tipping (i.e., 
at one standard deviation above the mean), tipping rate is higher when the minimum server wage 
is equal to $16.00 per hour versus when the minimum server wage is equal to $2.13 per hour.  
This finding indicates that guests who perceive voluntary tipping as less fair, and accordingly 
would normally lower their tipping rate, have a tendency to increase their tipping rate when the 
minimum server wage is low, suggesting that a low minimum server wage displaces lower 
perceived fairness of voluntary tipping. 
The third interlinked test of conditional indirect effects found a significant interaction 
between voluntary tipping familiarity and service quality on perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping, resulting in support for hypothesis 11.  As the slope of the linear relationship between 
voluntary tipping familiarity and perceived fairness of voluntary tipping was relatively stronger 
for high service quality than for low service quality, there is evidence that the indirect effect of 
service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping is stronger when 
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voluntary tipping familiarity is higher.  This finding provides support for hypothesis 11a and 
suggests that guests with higher levels of voluntary tipping familiarity will tip relatively more for 
higher service quality than for lower service quality as they perceive voluntary tipping as a fair 
mechanism to reward servers for delivering a superior dining experience.  
The final test of conditional indirect effects found a significant index of moderated 
moderated mediation, resulting in support for hypothesis 12.  When familiarity with voluntary 
tipping is moderate (i.e., mean value) or high (i.e., maximum value), there is a significant 
indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping that is 
stronger when both voluntary tipping familiarity and the minimum server wage are higher. 
Study Two 
The hypothesis testing results for Study Two are displayed in Table 18.  
Table 18 
Study Two Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Supported 
H7 The effect of tipping policy on perceived fairness of tipping policy differs 
for different minimum server wage conditions.  Specifically, when the 
minimum server wage rate is low, voluntary tipping is perceived to be 
fairer than compulsory tipping.  When the minimum server wage is high, 
compulsory tipping is to be perceived fairer than voluntary tipping. 
 
No 
H10 Perceived value varies for different tipping policies.  Specifically, 
perceived value of voluntary tipping is higher than perceived value of 
compulsory tipping and perceived value of automatic service charge is 
higher than perceived value of service inclusive pricing.  
Partially 
  
The results of Study Two revealed limited evidence that the minimum server wage and 
tipping policy taken together influence guest perceptions of fairness of tipping policy.  Although 
numerous customer attitudinal surveys have indicated a preference for servers to earn guaranteed 
income rather than unreliable tip income (Lynn & Withiam, 2008), the current research did not 
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find evidence that the minimum server wage affects perceived fairness of tipping policy.  As it 
was expected that the minimum server wage would influence perceived fairness of tipping 
policy, these findings refute hypothesis 7.  Lynn and Wang (2013) suggested that higher levels of 
empathy may lead to higher perceived fairness of compulsory tipping policies.  However, Study 
Two did not find evidence for this relationship as empathy was not a significant covariate when 
testing for a difference in mean perceived fairness across different tipping policies.  The results 
of Study Two confirmed Lynn and Wang’s (2013) findings that voluntary tipping is perceived to 
be fairer than both automatic service charge and service inclusive pricing.  Interestingly, there 
was no significant difference in perceived fairness between the two compulsory tipping policies.   
 Study Two results indicate that tipping policy affects perceptions of value.  Specifically, 
voluntary tipping has higher perceived value compared to both automatic service charge and 
service inclusive pricing.  As Lynn and Wang (2013) found that service inclusive pricing is 
perceived to be more expensive than automatic service charge, it was expected that automatic 
service charge would have higher perceptions of value.  However, Study Two results did not find 
evidence for this relationship, accordingly hypothesis 10 was only partially supported.   
Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on restaurant tipping, the minimum server 
wage, and restaurant pricing.  Equity theory and social norms theory are well established in 
hospitality literature as applicable theoretical frameworks to elucidate the ubiquitous tipping 
phenomenon in the restaurant industry.  Utilizing social norms theory, tipping researchers have 
investigated an array of variables to explicate the rationale for restaurant guests to transfer 
voluntary consideration after services have been rendered, and equity theory to predict tipping 
rate using established antecedent variables.  Although past research has identified that guests cite 
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low server wage as a reason to voluntarily adhere to the social norm of tipping (Azar, 2005a; 
Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1999; Lynn, 2006a), the influence of the minimum server wage on 
tipping rate has never been empirically tested.  This dissertation contributes to the theoretical 
body of knowledge by introducing the minimum server wage as an additional input into the 
equity theory input to output equation of restaurant tipping.   
In contrast with select past studies (Bodvarsson & Gibson, 1994; Lynn & Latané, 1984; 
May, 1980), this dissertation presents additional evidence, using experimental data, to further 
support service quality as a significant predictor of tipping rate (Bodvarsson, Luksetich, & 
McDermott, 2003; Lynn, 2001; Lynn & Graves, 1996).  In addition, when controlling for 
voluntary tipping familiarity, the minimum server wage was found to affect tipping rate.  
Directly addressing Even and Macpherson’s (2014) call for future research on the effect of 
higher server wages on tipping rate, this study found that tipping rate is lower when the 
minimum server wage is higher.  In jurisdictions with tip credits, Allegretto and Nadler (2015) 
found that a 10% increase in the minimum server wage results in an increase of server income by 
0.4% and called for further research into the composition of server pay.  This dissertation adds to 
their findings by presenting evidence that the minimum server wage influences the tip 
component of server pay.  Specifically, this current research found that tipping rate varies as a 
function of the minimum server wage.   
Although limited evidence was gathered to support an interaction effect of the minimum 
server wage and service quality on tipping rate, results substantiate the moderating influence of 
the minimum server wage on the indirect effect of service quality on tipping rate. The current 
findings add to previous literature on relevant inputs and outputs of restaurant tipping (Lynn & 
Grassman, 1990; Lynn & Graves, 1996; McAdams & von Massow, 2017; Videbeck, 2004) by 
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determining that the minimum server wage is a significant input that should be included in the 
equity theory input to output ratio of tipping.  While this current study focused on service quality 
as the focal output in the equity theory input to output equation, other outputs, such as 
psychological utility, have been identified in the literature (Azar, 2003).  Evidence collected by 
this study provides a foundation for future research into the weighting of the minimum server 
wage in the equity equation relative to other inputs and outputs.  Azar (2012) developed a series 
of economic equations that posited the existence of an equilibrium minimum server wage that 
determines whether a restaurant should implement a voluntary tipping policy or a compulsory 
tipping policy.  Several variables used in his equations implicitly require service quality to 
directly influence tipping rate.  The results of this dissertation’s investigation of the relationships 
among the minimum server wage, service quality, and tipping rate provides supplemental 
support for the validity of Azar’s (2012) series of equations.   
This dissertation affords new insights into multiple variants of perceived fairness with 
respect to the tipping phenomenon.  Distinctively, perceived fairness of the minimum server 
wage, voluntary tipping, automatic service charge, and service inclusive pricing were studied.  
This current study found evidence of a positive relationship between the minimum server wage 
and perceived fairness of the minimum server wage, extending previous research that a minimum 
wage increases fairness, in both monopsonistic labor markets (Card & Krueger, 1995) and 
general competitive labor markets when social costs are taken into consideration (Kaufman, 
2009), to the restaurant server labor market.  However, limited evidence was collected for the 
relationship between perceived fairness of the minimum server wage and other variables of 
interest, specifically tipping rate.  The absence of a significant relationship between perceived 
fairness of the minimum server wage and tipping rate contrasted expectations as it was 
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anticipated that the effect of the minimum server wage on tipping rate would be transmitted 
through perceived fairness of the minimum server wage.  Future research could consider 
investigating other intermediary variables between the minimum server wage and tipping rate.   
Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping was found to have a pivotal mediating role on the 
effect of service quality on tipping rate.  This finding suggests support for Lynn and Wang’s 
(2013) speculation that guests perceive voluntary tipping fairer than compulsory tipping as 
voluntary tipping is a mechanism to reward servers for effort, thereby enforcing an equitable 
relationship as posited by equity theory.  The novel finding that perceived fairness of voluntary 
tipping mediates the effect of service quality on tipping rate while perceived fairness of the 
minimum server wage does not significantly mediate the effect of the minimum server wage on 
tipping rate, illustrates the multi-dimensionality of fairness in guest tipping attitudes, perceptions, 
and behaviors.  It is possible that an unidentified intermediary variable exists between perceived 
fairness of the minimum server wage and tipping rate, providing another interesting possibility 
for future research.  Although voluntary tipping was found to be fairer than either compulsory 
tipping policy, confirming Lynn and Wang’s (2013) findings, it is interesting that the minimum 
server wage was not found to have an effect on perceived fairness of tipping policy.  
Accordingly, in contrast with expectations, an interaction effect of tipping policy and the 
minimum server wage on perceived fairness of tipping policy was not significant.  Since Lynn 
and Withiam (2008) found that guests have a preference for servers to earn constant income, 
rather than tip income, it was posited that when the minimum server wage is high, guests would 
perceive compulsory tipping to be fairer than voluntary tipping, as servers would be earning a 
constant higher income rather than income composed of a constant lower direct wage and 
fluctuating tip income.  
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Experimental data from Study Two revealed that perceptions of value differs across 
tipping policies and that voluntary tipping, a manifest form of partition pricing, has the highest 
level of perceived value overall.  Congruent with Lynn and Wang’s (2013) finding that voluntary 
tipping is perceived less expensive than both automatic service charge and service inclusive 
pricing, study results revealed that voluntary tipping has higher levels of perceived value than 
compulsory tipping.  Hypothesis 10 predicted that, due to the transparent nature of automatic 
service charge versus the opaque nature of service inclusive pricing, perceived value of 
automatic service charge is higher than perceived value of service inclusive pricing.  However, 
Study Two results did not provide support for hypothesis 10.  It appears that the presentation of 
partition pricing versus bundle pricing or the discretionary nature versus the mandatory nature of 
a tipping policy, rather than degree of transparency has a stronger influence on guest perceptions 
of value.  This result provides new evidence that the elective nature of voluntary tipping may 
amplify guests’ tendency to make insufficient upward adjustments for surcharges when 
anchoring and adjusting (Morwitz, Greenleaf, & Johnson, 1998).  Interestingly, empathy was a 
significant covariate in the test of mean differences, suggesting that guests consider server 
working conditions when evaluating the value of restaurant purchases.   
Finally, this dissertation found that the effect of service quality on perceived fairness of 
voluntary tipping varies as a function of familiarity with voluntary tipping.  This result adds to 
extant restaurant pricing literature by presenting tipping, as a restaurant pricing mechanism, 
evidence to further support the influence of pricing familiarity on perceived price fairness 
(Kimes, 2008; McGuire & Kimes, 2006). 
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Practical Implications 
 Several valuable practical implications have emerged from the results of this dissertation.  
Although the influence of the minimum server wage on tipping behavior and perceptions was 
examined from the perspective of guests, insights were found for various restaurant industry 
stakeholders.   
It is recommended that public policy makers acknowledge the positive association 
between the minimum server wage and guest perceptions of fairness of the minimum server 
wage.  Study results indicate that the current lowest minimum server wage of $2.13 per hour, 
which has prevailed since 1991 (Allegretto & Nadler, 2015; Jones, 2016; US Department of 
Labor, 2019b), is perceived to be less fair than the current highest minimum server wage of 
$16.00 per hour.  Tipping is an available means for guests to address low levels of perceived 
fairness, and subsequently increase hourly server income above the minimum server wage.  
However, tipping is either voluntary and conditional on guest behavior, or compulsory with 
parameters established by restaurants.  Accordingly, tip income is uncertain, volatile, and 
fluctuates due to conditions outside servers’ control.  Policy makers, however, are in a position to 
reduce server income uncertainty by regulating the minimum server wage and are advised to 
consider guest perceptions of fairness of the minimum server wage, as public opinion, in the 
determination of the minimum server wage. 
Although service quality was not the principal variable of interest, this research provides 
further empirical evidence of a monotonically increasing function between service quality and 
tipping rate.  As servers have a high degree of control over service quality, to maximize tip 
income, servers should strive to deliver the highest level of service quality possible irrespective 
of all other controllable and non-controllable factors.  Notwithstanding the influence of 
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intermediary variables, such as the minimum server wage, service quality is a predominant 
antecedent to tip income.  
In contrast, restaurants need to be cognizant of intermediary variables that mediate and 
moderate the effect of service quality on tipping rate.  Despite a positive direct association 
between service quality and tipping rate, restaurants are advised against using server tips as an 
explicit measurement of service quality, and consequently implicit metric of server performance.  
As this research revealed, a high tipping rate may not necessarily result from high service 
quality, but rather ensue from the effect of intermediary variables, such as a low minimum server 
wage, lower perceptions of fairness, or higher familiarity with tipping.  As the restaurant dining 
experience is composed of two primary value offerings, tangible food product and intangible 
service delivery, maintaining service quality at a prescribed standard is imperative to a 
restaurant’s success.  Although tips are an incentive and partial indicator of server performance, 
managers are advised to incorporate supplemental employee incentives and performance 
evaluation measures into their operations.  As tips are insufficient to fully evaluate service 
quality, it is recommended that restaurant managers consider incorporating employee 
motivational practices commonly utilized in other hospitality businesses, such as integrated 
resorts and cruise ships, where guest-facing employees do not regularly receive voluntary tips.  
Potential incentives and appraisals include recognizing a high performing server as employee of 
the month; tracking service failure scores and celebrating positive results with servers during 
pre-shift meetings; and encouraging guests to identify servers who have provided an outstanding 
dining experience. 
Study Two revealed implications for restaurants pertaining to different tipping policies.  
Specifically, perceived fairness of tipping policy and perceived value are higher with voluntary 
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tipping compared to automatic service charge and service inclusive pricing.  Possible reasons for 
these findings include: a lack of understanding of how servers ultimately receive a compulsory 
tip; concern that service quality will decline as servers are guaranteed a tip regardless of exerted 
effort; or concern that the compulsory tip amount is insufficient and incommensurate with the 
level of service quality delivered.  Restaurants operating with a compulsory tipping policy can 
mitigate against these concerns, increase perceived fairness, and enhance perceived value by 
clearly informing guests on the following: how servers directly benefit from the compulsory tip, 
either through a direct tip out or a higher hourly wage; management seeks to preserve service 
quality and that service failures will be addressed with appropriate service recovery procedures, 
such as removal of a compulsory tip from the bill; and permitting additional voluntary tipping at 
guests’ sole discretion.  Enhanced transparency of automatic service charge and service inclusive 
pricing will increase guest perceptions of fairness and familiarity with these policies while 
reduce differences in perceived value relative to ubiquitous traditional voluntary tipping.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 Characteristic of all research, limitations exist in this study that should be addressed in 
future research.  This dissertation composed of two online scenario based experiments requiring 
respondents to read a suppositional dining situation and to hypothetically respond to survey 
questions.  Notwithstanding pretesting, manipulation checks, and realism checks, results and 
findings may not generalize beyond the context of this dissertation.  Future studies may consider 
surveying actual restaurant guests immediately after a dining experience.   
Future research may seek to strengthen certain manipulations to capture true effects on 
dependent variables.  In particular, although the tipping policy manipulation check afforded 
significant differences across treatments, only 71% of overall respondents were able to correctly 
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identify their randomly assigned tipping policy.  Lynn and Wang (2013) attained the same 
accuracy ratio in their study of tipping policy on perceived expensiveness.  Despite strengthening 
the tipping policy descriptions after the pilot test, it appears that many respondents did not read 
the descriptions in sufficient detail or did not fully understand their respective tipping policy.  
Future tipping policy experiments may consider describing each policy in greater detail or 
incorporate more stringent participant qualifications, such as a minimum restaurant patronage 
frequency or a minimum level of familiarity with the three prevalent tipping policies.  As 
experimental research strives to maximize internal validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1966), less 
focus is placed on external generalizability.  Ultimately, the two experiments conducted for this 
dissertation were able to achieve the underlying research objective of examining the relationship 
between the minimum server wage and auxiliary variables of interest.  
 Despite the considerable number of past studies that have been conducted on restaurant 
tipping, this line of research offers extensive opportunities to deepen empirical understanding of 
this interesting phenomenon.  Study One of this dissertation focused exclusively on voluntary 
tipping, and specifically tipping rate as the final consequent variable.  Future studies of the 
minimum server wage as an antecedent variable under a voluntary tipping policy could examine 
other consequent variables, such as guest satisfaction, customer loyalty, and revisit intention.  
The relationship between the minimum server wage and guilt is another potential interesting 
association that could be explored.  For example, does the minimum server wage influence 
feelings of guilt in guests who violate the social norm of tipping?  Building on the research 
design of Study One, it would be worthwhile to add menu price as an additional factor to 
determine if tipping rate would significantly differ when guests are presented with increased 
menu prices resulting from a higher minimum server wage.  This follow-up study could be 
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conducted as a within-subjects factorial design by presenting respondents with an initial menu 
showing base line menu item prices in combination with a low minimum server wage in a pre-
treatment condition.  Next, a second menu with inflated menu item prices rationalized by a high 
minimum server wage could be presented to subjects in a post-treatment condition.  
 Respondents assigned to the two compulsory tipping treatments in Study Two were 
informed that additional voluntary tipping was not permitted and that the compulsory tip amount 
would be pass directly to the server as a tip out.  However, in practice, some restaurants allow 
guests to supplement a compulsory tip with an additional voluntary tip, and some restaurants do 
not pass compulsory tips directly to servers as a tip out, but rather remunerate servers at a higher 
direct hourly wage.  The effects arising from these nuanced variations of compulsory tipping 
could be investigated in future research.  Finally, this current study examined guest perceptions 
and attitudes of external tipping policies in isolation.  It would be interesting to explore guest 
perceptions of internal tipping policies, such as tip pooling or tip sharing among restaurant 
employees, in combination with external tipping policies. 
Summary 
 This chapter discussed research findings, identified theoretical and practical implications, 
and presented conclusions.  In conjunction with established antecedents of tipping, the effect of 
the minimum server wage on dependent variables of voluntary tipping rate and perceived 
fairness of tipping policy were empirically tested for the first time.  The application of equity 
theory provided unique insights into the interrelationships among influential variables affecting 
the complex phenomenon of restaurant tipping.  Research results indicate that the minimum 
server wage and voluntary tipping familiarity have moderating roles on the indirect effect of 
service quality on tipping rate via perceived fairness of voluntary tipping.  In addition, voluntary 
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tipping has higher perceived fairness and perceived value than automatic service charge and 
service inclusive pricing.  The findings presented in this dissertation provide new information to 
researchers and industry stakeholders on the effects of the minimum server wage on guest 
tipping behavior and server income.  
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APPENDIX A  
IRB APPROVAL 
UNLV Social/Behavioral IRB - Exempt Review Exempt Notice 
DATE:  June 7, 2019 
TO:  Carola Raab   
FROM:  Office of Research Integrity - Human Subjects 
 
PROTOCOL TITLE:  [1437344-2] The Effect of the Minimum Server Wage on 
Restaurant Guest Tipping Behavior and Perceptions  
 
ACTION: 	 DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT STATUS	
EXEMPT DATE:  June 7, 2019 
REVIEW CATEGORY:  Exemption category #2  
 
Thank you for your submission of Revision materials for this protocol. This memorandum is 
notification that the protocol referenced above has been reviewed as indicated in Federal 
regulatory statutes 45CFR46.101(b) and deemed exempt.  
 
We will retain a copy of this correspondence with our records.  
 
PLEASE NOTE:  
Upon final determination of exempt status, the research team is responsible for conducting the 
research as stated in the exempt application reviewed by the ORI - HS and/or the IRB which 
shall include using the most recently submitted Informed Consent/Assent Forms (Information 
Sheet) and recruitment materials.  
 
If your project involves paying research participants, it is recommended to contact the ORI 
Program Coordinator at (702) 895-2794 to ensure compliance with the Policy for Incentives for 
Human Research Subjects.  
 
Any changes to the application may cause this protocol to require a different level of IRB 
review. Should any changes need to be made, please submit a Modification Form. When the 
above-referenced protocol has been completed, please submit a Continuing Review/Progress 
Completion report to notify ORI - HS of its closure.  
If you have questions, please contact the Office of Research Integrity - Human Subjects at 
IRB@unlv.edu or call 702-895-2794. Please include your protocol title and IRBNet ID in all 
correspondence.  
 
Office of Research Integrity - Human Subjects 	
4505 Maryland Parkway Box 451047 Las Vegas, Nevada 89154-1047  
(702) 895-2794 FAX: (702) 895-0805 IRB@unlv.edu 
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APPENDIX B  
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Study 
The Effect of the Minimum Server Wage on Restaurant Guest Tipping Behavior and 
Perceptions. 
 
Investigators 
Carola Raab, Ph.D., Harrah College of Hospitality, University of Nevada, Las Vegas and Jason 
Tang, Harrah College of Hospitality, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the study, you may contact Jason Tang at (702) 895-
5438 or tangj7@unlv.nevada.edu or Dr. Carola Raab at (702) 895-5406 or 
carola.raab@unlv.edu. 
  
For questions regarding the rights of research subjects, complaints or comments regarding the 
manner in which this study is being conducted, you may contact the UNLV Office of Research 
Integrity – Human Subjects at (702) 895-2794, toll free at 1-888-581-2794 or via email at 
IRB@unlv.edu.  
  
Purpose of the Study  
You have been invited to participate in a research study conducted by faculty at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. The purpose of this study is to evaluate restaurant guest tipping behavior 
and perceptions. 
 
You are being asked to participate in the study because you have dined in a restaurant at least 
once in the past month. If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete an 
online survey. There are no right or wrong answers in this survey, just your opinions. There is no 
financial cost to you to participate in this study. The study should take about 15 minutes to 
complete. You will not be compensated for your time by the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
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Risks of Participation 
There are risks involved in all research studies. This study may include minimal risks. In this 
study, you may feel uncomfortable answering some questions or be unable to provide an answer. 
We do not anticipate any further risks from participating in this survey. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information gathered in this study will be kept as confidential as possible. No reference will 
be made in written or oral materials that could link you to this study. All records will be stored in 
a locked facility at UNLV for three (3) years after the completion of this study. After the storage 
time, the information gathered will be destroyed  
 
Voluntary Participation 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may refuse to participate in this study or in any 
part of this study. You may withdraw at any time without prejudice to your relations with 
UNLV. You are encouraged to ask questions about this study at the beginning or at any time 
during the research study. 
 
Participant Consent:  
By checking the box below, I indicate that I have read the above information and agree to 
participate in this study. I have been able to ask questions about the research study. I am at least 
18 years of age. 
 
Please click below to indicate your agreement. 
m I agree 
m I do not agree 
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APPENDIX C 
STUDY ONE QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Informed consent 
 
B. Screener questions  
 
1. What is your age? 
m Under 18 
m 18 – 20 
m 21 – 30 
m 31 – 40 
m 41 – 50 
m 51 – 60 
m 61 – 70 
m Over 70 
 
2. Have you eaten in a restaurant in the past month? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
C. Tipping familiarity measures 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read all of the following information carefully and answer ALL of the questions.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I am familiar with tipping in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Tipping in restaurants is usual m m m m m m m 
 Tipping in restaurants is typical m m m m m m m 
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2. An automatic service charge is a tip that a restaurant adds to the bill.  The service 
charge is a percent of the bill total.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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 I am familiar with automatic 
service charges in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Automatic service charges in 
restaurants are usual 
m m m m m m m 
 Automatic service charges in 
restaurants are typical 
m m m m m m m 
 
3. A restaurant with all-inclusive pricing does not allow tipping as menu prices have 
already been increased so that the restaurant can pay higher server wages. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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 I am familiar with all-inclusive 
pricing in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  All-inclusive pricing in restaurants 
is usual 
m m m m m m m 
 All-inclusive pricing in restaurants 
is typical 
m m m m m m m 
 
D. Experiment 
 
1. Minimum server wage condition - randomly displayed 
 
i. $2.13 per hour  
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $2.13 per hour in this town.   
 
ii. $16.00 per hour 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $16.00 per hour in this town.    
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2. Dining scenario 
 
 
 
 
You walk into the restaurant. The hostess sees you walk in and greets you.  You tell 
her that you are dining by yourself.   
  
The hostess seats you at a table and gives you a menu. 
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3. Service quality condition - randomly displayed 
 
i. Low service quality condition 
 
Your server sees you sit down but does not immediately greet you.  A few 
minutes after you finish reading the menu, your server greets you and asks for 
your order.  You ask her about the ingredients in the soup of the day and the 
daily special, but she is unable to answer your questions.  You decide not to 
order the soup or the daily special.  You order an iced tea, chicken wings as an 
appetizer, and the spaghetti & meatballs. 
 
The server brings you the iced tea and chicken wings. After you finish the 
chicken wings, the server brings out the spaghetti & meatballs but does not 
take away the empty chicken wings plate.  The food tastes as you expected but 
you need an extra napkin.  Your server does not return so after waiting a few 
minutes, you walk over to the hostess to get a napkin. 
 
ii. High service quality condition 
 
Your server sees you sit down and immediately greets you.  After you finish 
reading the menu, your server returns and asks for your order.  You ask her 
about the ingredients in the soup of the day and the daily special.  She is able 
to answer all of your questions.  You order an iced tea, chicken wings as an 
appetizer, and the spaghetti & meatballs.   
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The server brings you the iced tea and chicken wings.  After you finish the 
chicken wings, the server brings out the spaghetti & meatballs and takes away 
the empty chicken wings plate.  The food tastes as you expected.  Shortly 
after, the server returns and asks if you need anything else.  You ask for 
another napkin and she immediately brings you one.  
 
4. Bill stimulus and tipping scenario 
 
After you finish your meal, the server returns with your bill and takes away all the 
empty dishes.   
 
 
You give the server a credit card and she returns with a mobile credit card terminal 
showing the following: 
 
Thank you for dining at Golden Mountain Restaurant 
 
Your bill total is $22.75 
 
Would you like to add a tip? 
m Yes, add dollar ($) tip 
m Yes, add percent (%) of pre-tax subtotal tip 
m Yes, add percent (%) of bill total tip 
m No, do not add tip 
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E. Perceived fairness of the minimum server wage measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is fair 
m m m m m m m 
  I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is acceptable 
m m m m m m m 
 I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is reasonable 
m m m m m m m 
 
F. Perceived fairness of voluntary tipping fairness measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
N
eu
tra
l 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e 
A
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
 I think tipping servers is fair m m m m m m m 
  I think tipping servers is acceptable m m m m m m m 
 I think tipping servers is reasonable m m m m m m m 
 
G. Tipping behavior measures 
 
1. In this scenario, would you have tipped differently if you were dining with other 
people instead of by yourself? 
m No 
m Yes, I would have tipped more 
m Yes, I would have tipped less 
 
H. Manipulation Checks 
 
1. I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high hourly wage. 
Strongly   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
disagree         agree 
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2. How would you rate the service quality at this restaurant? 
Very low  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very high 
 
1. How realistic is this restaurant scenario? 
Completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
unrealistic         realistic 
 
I. Empathy measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I tip to reward good service m m m m m m m 
  I tip to help servers make a living m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to feel satisfaction 
from doing what is right 
m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to express my 
generosity 
m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to support the custom 
of tipping 
m m m m m m m 
 
J. Minimum server wage attitudes 
 
1. Do you know your local minimum server wage? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
2. What is your zip code? 
 
3. What is your local minimum server wage? 
 
4. What do you think the minimum server wage should be? 
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K. Tipping policy attitudes 
 
An automatic service charge is a tip that a restaurant adds to the bill.  The service charge 
is a percent of the bill total.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
 
A restaurant with all-inclusive pricing does not allow tipping as menu prices have already 
been increased so that the restaurant can pay higher server wages. 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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 I prefer tipping in restaurants m m m m m m m 
  I prefer automatic service charges 
in restaurants  
m m m m m m m 
 I prefer all-inclusive pricing in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
 
2. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 Since restaurants pay servers the 
minimum server wage, I prefer 
tipping in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Since restaurants pay servers the 
minimum server wage, I prefer 
automatic service charges in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
 I prefer all-inclusive pricing in 
restaurants so that restaurants 
can pay servers higher wages 
m m m m m m m 
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L. Demographics measures  
 
1. What is your gender? 
m Male 
m Female 
 
2. What is your highest education level? 
m Some high school 
m High school 
m Associate degree 
m Bachelor degree 
m Graduate degree 
 
3. What is your annual household income? 
m Under $25,000 
m $25,000 to $49,999 
m $50,000 to $74,999 
m $75,000 to $99,999 
m $100,000 and over 
 
4. What is your employment status? 
m Full-time  
m Part-time  
m Retired  
m Unemployed 
m Student 
m Self employed 
 
M. Restaurant dining frequency measure 
 
1. On average, how many times a month do you dine out at restaurants? 
 
N. Restaurant work experience measure 
 
1. I have restaurant work experience 
m Yes 
m No 
 
2. I have restaurant server work experience 
m Yes 
m No 
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APPENDIX D  
STUDY TWO QUESTIONNAIRE 
B. Informed consent 
 
C. Screener questions  
 
1. What is your age? 
m Under 18 
m 18 – 20 
m 21 – 30 
m 31 – 40 
m 41 – 50 
m 51 – 60 
m 61 – 70 
m Over 70 
 
2. Have you eaten in a restaurant in the past month? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
D. Tipping familiarity measures 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Please read all of the following information carefully and answer ALL of the questions.  
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
N
eu
tra
l 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e 
A
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
 I am familiar with tipping in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Tipping in restaurants is usual m m m m m m m 
 Tipping in restaurants is typical m m m m m m m 
 
  
 129 
2. An automatic service charge is a tip that a restaurant adds to the bill.  The service 
charge is a percent of the bill total.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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 I am familiar with automatic 
service charges in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Automatic service charges in 
restaurants are usual 
m m m m m m m 
 Automatic service charges in 
restaurants are typical 
m m m m m m m 
 
3. A restaurant with all-inclusive pricing does not allow tipping as menu prices have 
already been increased so that the restaurant can pay higher server wages. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
  
St
ro
ng
ly
 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
di
sa
gr
ee
 
N
eu
tra
l 
So
m
ew
ha
t 
ag
re
e 
A
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
ag
re
e 
 I am familiar with all-inclusive 
pricing in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  All-inclusive pricing in restaurants 
is usual 
m m m m m m m 
 All-inclusive pricing in restaurants 
is typical 
m m m m m m m 
 
E. Experiment 
 
1. Treatment - randomly displayed 
 
i. $2.13 per hour x Voluntary tipping policy 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $2.13 per hour in this town.   
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ii. $16.00 per hour x Voluntary tipping policy 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $16.00 per hour in this town.   
 
iii. $2.13 per hour x Automatic service charge 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $2.13 per hour in this town.   
 
The restaurant has an automatic 15% service charge that will be added to your 
bill.  The service charge will be passed to servers as a tip.  Additional tipping 
is not allowed. 
 
iv. $16.00 per hour x Automatic service charge 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $16.00 per hour in this town.   
 
The restaurant has an automatic 15% service charge that will be added to your 
bill.  The service charge will be passed to servers as a tip.  Additional tipping 
is not allowed. 
 
v. $2.13 per hour x Service inclusive pricing 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $2.13 per hour in this town.   
 
The restaurant has an all-inclusive pricing policy.  Menu prices have been 
increased by 15% so that the restaurant can pay servers a tip on top of the 
minimum server wage.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
 
vi. $16.00 per hour x Service inclusive pricing 
 
Imagine that you are going for dinner at a new restaurant in town.  This is 
your first visit to this restaurant.  The restaurant pays its servers the minimum 
server wage, which is $16.00 per hour in this town.   
 
The restaurant has an all-inclusive pricing policy.  Menu prices have been 
increased by 15% so that the restaurant can pay servers a tip on top of the 
minimum server wage.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
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2. Restaurant stimulus 
 
 
 
 
3. Menu stimulus 
 
You walk into the restaurant.  The hostess sees you walk in and immediately greets 
you.  You tell her that you are dining by yourself.  The hostess seats you at a table 
and gives you the menu. 
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i. Voluntary tipping condition 
 
 
ii. Automatic service charge condition 
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iii. Service inclusive condition 
 
 
4. Bill stimulus 
Your server sees you sit down and immediately greets you.  After you finish reading 
the menu, your server returns and asks for your order.  You order an iced tea, chicken 
wings as an appetizer, and the spaghetti & meatballs. 
   
The server brings you the iced tea and chicken wings.  After you finish the chicken 
wings, the server brings out the spaghetti & meatballs and takes away the empty 
chicken wings plate.  The food tastes as you expected.  
 
After you finish your meal, the server returns with your bill and takes away all the 
empty dishes. 
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i. Voluntary tipping condition 
 
ii. Automatic service charge condition 
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iii. Service inclusive condition 
 
 
F. Perceived fairness of tipping policy measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I think tipping servers (automatic 
service charges) (all-inclusive 
pricing) is fair 
m m m m m m m 
  I think tipping servers (automatic 
service charges) (all-inclusive 
pricing) is acceptable 
m m m m m m m 
 I think tipping servers (automatic 
service charges) (all-inclusive 
pricing) is reasonable 
m m m m m m m 
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G. Perceived fairness of minimum server wage measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is fair 
m m m m m m m 
  I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is acceptable 
m m m m m m m 
 I think that the $2.13 per hour 
($16.00 per hour) minimum 
server wage is reasonable 
m m m m m m m 
 
H. Perceived value measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 This restaurant offered good value 
for the price 
m m m m m m m 
  The overall value of dining at this 
restaurant was high 
m m m m m m m 
 This dining experience was worth 
the money 
m m m m m m m 
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I. Manipulation Checks 
1. I think that servers at this restaurant are paid a high hourly wage. 
Strongly  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly 
disagree         agree 
 
2. Which of the following best describes this restaurant’s tipping policy? 
m Tipping 
m Automatic service charge 
m All-inclusive pricing 
 
3. How realistic is this restaurant scenario? 
Completely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely 
unrealistic         realistic 
 
J. Empathy measures 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 I tip to reward good service m m m m m m m 
  I tip to help servers make a living m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to feel satisfaction 
from doing what is right 
m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to express my 
generosity 
m m m m m m m 
 I tip in order to support the custom 
of tipping 
m m m m m m m 
 
K. Minimum server wage attitudes 
 
1. Do you know your local minimum server wage? 
m Yes 
m No 
 
2. What is your zip code? 
 
3. What is your local minimum server wage? 
 
4. What do you think the minimum server wage should be? 
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L. Tipping policy attitudes 
 
An automatic service charge is a tip that a restaurant adds to the bill.  The service charge 
is a percent of the bill total.  Additional tipping is not allowed. 
 
A restaurant with all-inclusive pricing does not allow tipping as menu prices have already 
been increased so that the restaurant can pay higher server wages. 
 
1. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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 I prefer tipping in restaurants m m m m m m m 
  I prefer automatic service charges 
in restaurants  
m m m m m m m 
 I prefer all-inclusive pricing in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
 
2. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:  
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 Since restaurants pay servers the 
minimum server wage, I prefer 
tipping in restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
  Since restaurants pay servers the 
minimum server wage, I prefer 
automatic service charges in 
restaurants 
m m m m m m m 
 I prefer all-inclusive pricing in 
restaurants so that restaurants 
can pay servers higher wages 
m m m m m m m 
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M. Demographics measures  
 
1. What is your gender? 
m Male 
m Female 
 
2. What is your highest education level? 
m Some high school 
m High school 
m Associate degree 
m Bachelor degree 
m Graduate degree 
 
3. What is your annual household income? 
m Under $25,000 
m $25,000 to $49,999 
m $50,000 to $74,999 
m $75,000 to $99,999 
m $100,000 and over 
 
4. What is your employment status? 
m Full-time  
m Part-time  
m Retired  
m Unemployed 
m Student 
m Self employed 
 
N. Restaurant dining frequency measure 
 
1. On average, how many times a month do you dine out at restaurants? 
 
O. Restaurant work experience measure 
 
1. I have restaurant work experience 
m Yes 
m No 
 
2. I have restaurant server work experience 
m Yes 
m No 
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